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INTRODUCTION

Comparative-fault defenses rarely attract much public
attention. However, a recent lawsuit highlighted the subject. In a suit
filed against the archdiocese of Boston stemming from an ongoing
sexual abuse scandal, Cardinal Bernard Law asserted that a boy who
had been abused by a priest from the time that he was six years old to
the time that he was thirteen years old was himself guilty of
comparative fault.1 The defense became the subject of immediate
public scrutiny. Commentators described the defense with adjectives
ranging from "reprehensible," "appalling," and "not sensitive," to
'
"legalese," "boilerplate," "standard," and even "necessary. "2
The Cardinal's defense, and the accompanying public reaction,
brings an important legal question to the fore-after states'
widespread adoption of comparative fault and comparative
apportionment, when should courts consider barring a comparativefault defense altogether?
This question about appropriate judicial limits on comparativefault defenses is particularly timely in light of the proposed
Restatement Third of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm. The
Restatement, which places jury risk-utility analyses at the center of
tort decisionmaking in both negligence and comparative negligence,
has revitalized debate about the appropriate scope of and limits on
3
jury risk-utility analyses in tort law.
Given the recent shift of states from all-or-nothing
contributory-negligence defenses to evaluations of incremental
comparative fault and responsibility, 4 it might be argued that courts
1.

Walter V. Robinson, An Alleged Victim Is Called Negligent, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29,

2002, at Al (noting that the Cardinal raised this defense in the current case and had also raised
the defense in a previous case).
Id.; Editorial, When Legalese Causes Pain, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 30, 2002, at 24; Henry
2.
C. Luthin, A Necessary Defense, BOSTON HERALD, July 23, 2002, at 22.
3.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 3

(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM,
DRAFT 1]; Richard Wright, Negligence in the Courts: Introductionand Commentary, 77 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 425, 425 (2002).
4.
Only four states have retained contributory-negligence rules: Alabama, Maryland,
North Carolina, and Virginia. The District of Columbia also uses a contributory-negligence
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should never bar comparative-fault defenses. 5 Comparative fault not
only weakens traditional justifications for withholding questions of
defendant and plaintiff negligence from juries, but was arguably
6
meant to do so.
And yet, an approach that wholly substitutes jury process for
articulated legal standards has never been accepted with respect to
defendants' obligations.7 Even under the proposed Restatement, which
has been challenged as insufficiently protective of defendants'
categorical legal interests,8 judges still would curtail defendant
obligations through no-duty doctrines and other judicial limits.9
While limits on plaintiff and defendant obligations need not be
identical, some contemporary tort authorities treat plaintiff and

standard.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 17 (2000)

[hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF APPORTIONMENT]. As Dean Prosser wrote almost fifty years ago,
the term "comparative negligence" should be avoided in favor of the term "damage
apportionment" or "comparative damages." However, as he also noted, "comparative negligence"
is "in much too general use to permit much hope of its elimination." William L. Prosser,
Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (1953).
5.
See Gunnell v. Ariz. Pub. Servs., 46 P.3d 399, 405 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc) (interpreting a
state constitutional torts provision to require all defenses of plaintiff fault to go to a jury); Bell v.
Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 173 (La. 1985) (Watson, J., concurring) ("An approach which has
merit would be to allow victim fault to be advanced as a defense in any case considered under the
regime of comparative negligence with appropriate instruction to the jury or appropriate
application of certain legal principles in a bench trial.").
6.
See David W. Robertson, Love and Fury: Recent Radical Revisions to the Law of
Comparative Fault, 59 LA. L. REV. 175, 198-99 (1998) (praising comparative fault as the best
vehicle for achieving justice); David W. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault, DutyRisk Analysis, Affirmative Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability
Litigation in Louisiana, 44 LA. L. REV. 1341, 1361-63 (1984) (arguing that duty-risk limits on
comparative-fault defenses are undesirable because they create all-or-nothing claims, lack
predictability, and confuse multiparty litigation).
7.
See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1209-23
(2001) (arguing that leaving negligence questions to juries for determination substitutes process
for standards in a way that undermines legitimacy and consistency); see also 1 DAN B. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 225, at 575-77 (2001 & Supp. 2002) (describing limits on defendant
obligations).
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of
8.
Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 661 (2001) (criticizing the Restatement's attempt
to "downplay" the role of duty in negligence law).
9.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 7
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM,
DRAFT 2] ("A defendant is not liable for any harm caused if the court determines the defendant
owes no duty to the plaintiff, either in general or in relation to the particular negligence claim.");
RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 7 ("Even if the
defendant's conduct can be found negligent under § 3 and is the legal cause of the plaintiffs
physical harm, the defendant is not liable ... if the court determines the defendant owes no duty
to the plaintiff, either in general or relative to the particular negligence claim.").
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defendant standards of conduct as such.' 0 The rival view treats
contributory negligence as involving lesser obligations since the
relevant risks often (although not always) involve harm to self rather
than to others."
Still, even if the reverse presumption (that plaintiffs have
greater obligations of care than do defendants) is indulged, as it is in
the current draft of the Restatement, 2 at the outer limits of
comparative fault some allegations of plaintiff fault are plainly
problematic. What if a landlord argues that an infant was negligent
for eating lead paint chips?13 What if a church argues that a child was
4
at fault for failing to report promptly sexual abuse by its priest?
What if an emergency room doctor who carelessly misdiagnosed a
heart attack as heatstroke argues that the heart attack victim was
negligent for the cigarette smoking that led to his coronary artery
disease? 5 What if an apartment manager argues that a tenant who
was raped in its complex was negligent for living in a first-floor
apartment while female? 16 What if the producer of an ammonia cloud

10. RESTATEMENT OF APPORTIONMENT, supra note 4, § 3 ("Plaintiff's negligence is defined
by the applicable standard for defendant's negligence. Special ameliorative doctrines for
defining plaintiffs negligence are abolished.").
11. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes:A
Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C.
DAVIS. L. REV. 1141, 1191 (1988); 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.4, at 291293 (2d ed. 1986) (rejecting a "specious appearance of symmetry" between negligence and
contributory negligence and suggesting that given interests in plaintiff compensation a "doublestandard" had rightfully emerged); see also RESTATEMENT OF APPORTIONMENT, supra note 4, § 3
cmt. b (noting that in many situations-"especially those involving highway traffic-the conduct
of the actor imperils both the actor and third parties"). Although this Article generally refers to
the plaintiffs negligence as comparative negligence, courts and the Restatement often refer to the
plaintiffs contributory negligence even within a comparative-fault or apportionment jurisdiction.
"In a comparative fault regime, the conduct may still be called contributory negligence, but the
legal effect of that contributory negligence is different." Id.
12. See RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 3 cmt. b.
13. See Lopez v. No Kit Realty Corp., 679 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (App. Div. 1998) (striking
defendant's affirmative defense on the ground that a two-year-old child who ate paint chips "was
not yet legally capable of negligence").
14. Hutchison v. Luddy, 763 A.2d 826, 846 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (finding that the trial court
properly removed comparative fault from sexual abuse case against diocese because fifteen-yearold abuse victim who met priest at a motel on two occasions had no "duty" to protect himself from
sexual abuse).
15. Magee v. Pittman, 761 So. 2d 731, 739 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding jury
determination of comparative fault in plaintiffs case against doctor for emergency room
malpractice in part because "[t]he evidence reveals that Mr. Magee smoked cigarettes regularly,
and that smoking is a risk factor in coronary artery disease").
16. Jackson v. Post Props., Inc., 513 S.E.2d 259, 262-263 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (calling the
comparative-fault argument "untenable" but nevertheless holding that "a jury must determine
whether [plaintiffs] move to a ground floor apartment was a failure to exercise ordinary care for
her own safety").
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argues that a homeowner was negligent for getting into her car and
driving off her property when its chemicals seeped through her
windows? 17 What if a seventeen-year-old driver argues that a
passenger injured in the speed-related car accident the driver caused
8
was negligent for accepting a ride from the inexperienced driver?'
Although courts have permitted some of these comparativefault defenses and rejected others, my goal in this Article is to show
that in all of these cases judicial consideration of limits on plaintifffault defenses (and through them the baseline entitlements of tort
litigants/citizens) is appropriate. 19
Courts limit comparative-fault defenses in a wide array of
cases (far wider than has been previously acknowledged). I argue that
these court-created limits are not haphazard but rather grounded in
identifiable, consistent, and important normative principles. This
Article does not attempt to prove that comparative-fault defenses
should be limited in any particular situation, although in many of the
cases addressed there is a strong normative argument for such limits.
Rather, this Article attempts to elucidate the broader structure of
principles and policies that underlie judicial limits on comparativefault defenses. Further, when these special issues of principle or policy
arise in comparative-fault defenses, I argue that courts should
seriously consider employing the Restatement's proffered plaintiff noduty provisions to limit those defenses.
By way of overview, Part II of this Article examines provisions
of the Restatement of Liability for Physical Harm that define and limit
plaintiff obligations. The Restatement requires plaintiffs and
defendants to use reasonable care to avoid physical injuries to others
(and to self when others are also at risk). However, only plaintiffs are
required to use reasonable care to avoid exclusive self-harm. The
Restatement then provides a parallel method for courts to create
exceptions to plaintiff and defendant duties of care based on special
problems of principle or policy: no-duty rules. Consequently, the
17. Haydel v. Hercules Transp., Inc., 654 So. 2d 418, 431 (La. App. 1995) (finding no
manifest error in jury allocation of ten percent fault to plaintiff who "panicked" and feared for
her and her children's lives when she saw an ammonia cloud).
18. Thompson v. Michael, 435 S.E.2d 853, 854 (S.C. 1993) ('The fact that [the passenger]
knew [the driver] had been driving only a short time is not evidence of contributory negligence.").
19. Cf.RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 7 cmt. a
("Common-law courts traditionally rejected [suits against negligent property owners initiated by
trespassers], but a limited number of modern courts have found them acceptable; whatever the
result, judicial considerationin terms of duty is appropriate.")(emphasis added). I use the term
"citizen" to emphasize that before any specific injury; entitlements belong not only to plaintiffs
but to the general population. I do not mean to suggest that these entitlements depend on
formal requirements of national citizenship.
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Restatement creates both broader obligations for plaintiffs than for
defendants and meaningful judicial mechanisms for curtailing
comparative negligence as well as negligence claims.
Part III then examines the many cases in which, even without
a formal mechanism for considering principle or policy factors, courts
have elected to limit comparative-fault defenses. This part first
explores methods that judges have employed to limit comparativefault defenses. It then identifies common principle and policy factors
that arise in these cases. The Article contends that judges limit
comparative-fault defenses when one or more of the following six
principle and policy factors are present: 1) recognized absence of
capacity-the plaintiff lacks total or partial capacity for self-care and
the plaintiffs incapacity is recognizable and socially accepted; 2)
structural safety-due to systemic differentials in knowledge,
experience or control, the defendant can be expected to take better
care of the plaintiffs safety than can the plaintiff herself; 3) role
definition-it is the defendant's obligation to care for a negligent
plaintiff because of social or contractual understandings about the
defendant's responsibilities as a professional rescuer; 4) process
values-the very process of litigating the comparative-fault defenses
would harm the litigants, create expensive or unmanageable litigation
issues, or produce a statement of relative fault in an area in which
relative statements are viewed as problematic; 5) fundamental
values-a determination of plaintiff comparative fault would encroach
on fundamental, sometimes constitutional, values; and 6) autonomy
and self-risk judgment-plaintiffs conduct can be considered
reasonable or unreasonable but risked only harm to self and as such
receives more latitude for risk.
Although separately identified for analytic clarity, these
principle and policy factors can and frequently do overlap. For
example, in the case involving Cardinal Law, if a court were to
disallow the comparative-fault defense that the Cardinal raised
against the child sexual abuse victim, as some courts have done in
similar cases, 20 the defense could be disallowed based on 1) the
plaintiffs lesser capacity for self care as a child, 2) the structural

20. See Hutchison v. Luddy, 763 A.2d 826, 847-48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (stating that church
that was negligent in hiring, supervising, and retaining sexually abusive priest could not claim
comparative fault of boy for continuing to see priest despite ongoing abuse); DeBose v. Bear
Valley Church of Christ, 890 P.2d 214, 231 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting church claim against
boy who had been sexually abused, as boy could not be expected to report instances of abuse in
such situations), rev'd on other grounds, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1997); cf. Landreneau v. Fruge, 676
So. 2d 701, 707 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a child's teacher, coach, and bus driver could not
claim that the child was at fault for molestation).
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concern that the Church-as employer of the abusive priest, guardian
of the children, and holder of previous complaints about the priestwould be better able to protect children from priests' sexual advances
than would the children themselves, and/or 3) the process concerns
that stem from litigating a child's "fault" for ongoing sexual assaultboth because of the trauma that such victim-blaming might visit on
the child victim and because a jury conclusion that a child bears
partial responsibility for his own victimization would be normatively
unacceptable.
Having identified a number of principle and policy factors that
underlie state cases limiting plaintiff comparative-fault defenses, Part
IV proposes that when these issues of principle and policy arise, courts
should seriously consider excluding comparative-fault defenses as a
matter of law. In this consideration, judges should not only analyze
whether reasonable jurors could differ with respect to an issue of
comparative-fault (a negligence question), but should also state some
categorical rules about when comparative-fault questions will not be
left to a jury reasonableness determination as a matter of policy or
principle (a duty question). Specifically, in cases in which principle
and policy factors justify barring the claim of comparative fault,
judges should strike defendants' comparative-fault defenses on the
basis that the plaintiff has no duty in general 21 or in relation to the
22
particular comparative-fault claim.

21. See RESTATEMENT OF APPORTIONMENT, supra note 4, § 3(d) (enumerating "[slubstantive
rules of legal liability with respect to plaintiffs negligence, including plaintiffs who own real
property and plaintiffs injured by intentional tortfeasors"); DOBBS, supra note 7, § 200, at 503
(defining no-duty cases as "cases in which the plaintiff has a liberty (or right) to be free from
constraints imposed by the defendant"); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 8.2.1, at 189 (1999)
(including "duty" as an element of contributory negligence).
22. Even after the shift to comparative negligence, trial courts continue to grant summary
judgment, motions in limine, directed verdicts, and judgments notwithstanding the verdict for
plaintiffs on the issue of comparative fault. See, e.g., Maloley v. Glinsmann, No. A-96-516, 1997
WL 817830, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1997) (granting directed verdict for plaintiff on the
basis that "[lt was not negligent for [plaintiff] to fail to run a yellow light to avoid being hit by a
vehicle that is following too closely while attempting to change lanes"). Occasionally, courts even
grant motions for summary judgment or directed verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of
comparative negligence and on the issue of defendant's negligence. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Michael, 433 S.E.2d 853, 854-55 (S.C. 1993) (affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment
for the plaintiff on issue of comparative fault). In addition, appellate courts continue to hold that
instructions on comparative fault constitute an abuse of discretion in particular cases. See, e.g.,
Harding v. Deiss, 3 P.3d 1286, 1288-89 (Mont. 2000) (holding that trial court abused its
discretion when it instructed the jury on comparative fault in a medical malpractice case brought
by sixteen-year-old who went horseback riding despite her asthma).
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II. DEFINING PLAINTIFFS' OBLIGATION OF CARE: THE RESTATEMENT
OFLIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM

In the most recent draft of the Restatement of Liability for
Physical Harm, "an actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable
care when the actor's conduct poses a risk of physical harm." 23 If the
actor "does not exercise reasonable care under all of the
circumstances," she is negligent. 24 This definition of negligence applies
25
to both plaintiffs and defendants.
Although the current Restatement draft creates a duty for both
plaintiffs and defendants to take reasonable care to avoid "a risk of
physical harm," the draft is unclear about which risks of physical
harm plaintiffs and defendants have a duty to avoid-harms to others,
harms to self, either of these harms individually, or both only when
together. The draft is also unclear about whether the same duty
pertains to both plaintiffs and defendants.
With respect to plaintiffs' and defendants' duty to avoid risks to
self, the Restatement's black-letter rules are silent. However, the
Restatement commentary now states that "an actor whose conduct
poses risks of physical harm to others has a duty to exercise
reasonable care." 26 A similar statement restricting actors' duty to
cases of "conduct that poses risk to others" is echoed in commentary to
section 7, which appears for the first time in this draft of the
27
Restatement.
But while the duty provisions mention only harm to others, the
Restatement's negligence provisions clearly envision that both risks to
self and risks to others will be considered when evaluating plaintiff
and defendant negligence. Specifically, the Restatement counsels that
when "the conduct of the actor imperils both the actor and third
parties," "all the risks foreseeably resulting from the actor's conduct
are considered in ascertaining whether the actor has exercised
reasonable care." 28

23.

RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 2, supra note 9, § 6.

24.
25.

Id.
RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 3 cmt. b ('rhe

definition of negligence set forth in this section applies whether the issue is the negligence of the
defendant or the contributory negligence of the plaintiff."). Although the 2002 Restatement draft
supersedes the 2001 Restatement draft with respect to the black-letter sections addressed by the
new 2002 draft, the sections not addressed in the 2002 draft are controlled by the 2001 draft.
26.

RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 2, supra note 9, at § 6 cmt. b

(emphasis added).
27.

Id. § 7 cmt. a.

28.

Id.
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These seemingly contrary provisions might be harmonized by
reading them to require courts to make a threshold inquiry into risks
to others at the duty stage and then by permitting juries to evaluate
all risks to self and others during the breach inquiry.
Whether this focus on harm to others in the duty analysis and
harm to self and others in the breach analysis would be the same for
both plaintiffs and defendants is somewhat ambiguous. On one hand,
the use of neutral black-letter terms like "a person" and "an actor"
instead of "plaintiff' or "defendant" suggests that both plaintiff and
defendants have parallel duties under these Restatement terms. 29 This
view of parallel plaintiff and defendant obligations would be
consistent with other Restatement sections, including section 3 of the
Restatement of Liability for Physical Harm and section 3 of the
Restatement of Apportionment.30 And yet, although no mention is
made of risk to self as a potential source of obligation for plaintiffs in
the duty section, the negligence section comments that "in many cases,
the conduct of the plaintiff that counts as contributory negligence-for
example, carelessly climbing a household ladder-creates a risk only
to the plaintiff and not a third party."31 This comment, and perhaps
other commentary, is apparently meant to establish that plaintiffs,
unlike defendants, have an obligation of self-care (presumably owed to
32
some category of defendants).
The Restatement's new standards arguably expand plaintiffs
and defendants' existing legal obligations beyond their traditional
bounds. For defendants, the Restatement's standard expands liability
in two ways. First, under the Restatement, the defendants' duty of
reasonable care for others becomes a more explicit norm. 33 Second,
29. Id. § 7.
30. The text represents a proposed amendment to the Restatement draft. The latest draft of
section 7 now reads:
A court may determine that an actor has no duty or a duty other than the duty of
reasonable care.
Determinations of no duty and modifications of the duty of
reasonable care are unusual and are based on special problems of principle or policy
that warrant denying liability or limiting the ordinary duty of care in a particular
class of cases. A defendant is not liable for any harm caused if the court determines
the defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff, either in general or in relation to the
particular negligence claim. If the court determines a defendant is subject to a
modified duty, the defendant is subject to liability only for breach of the modified
duty.
RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 2, supra note 9, § 7.
31. RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 3 cmt. b.
32. Correspondence with Mike Green, Restatement Reporter (on file with author).
33. Formally, this framework departs from the traditional rule that plaintiffs in negligence
cases must establish the defendant's duty. See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 8. In
practice, however, this general rule of duty to use reasonable care for the physical safety of
others may already be the norm. See DOBBS, supra note 7, § 227, at 578 ("Among strangers-
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when defendants create risks of harm to self as well as to others, those
risks of personal harm now can be formally considered in the
34
negligence equation.
The Restatement also expands the plaintiffs legal obligations.
The Restatement notes, but makes no effort to accommodate, "certain
differences in emphasis between negligence and contributory
negligence. '3 5 These differences arise because negligence typically
involves risks of harm to others, while comparative negligence often
(though not always) involves risks of harm to self.36 Because imposing
risks of harm on oneself has been considered less blameworthy, equal
37
treatment of the two types of harm is a setback for plaintiffs.
After establishing the parties' asymmetric obligations to
exercise reasonable care for others and sometimes for self, the
Restatement entrusts the question of whether each party has exercised
38
reasonable care to jury decision.
Accompanying the Restatement's general standards for duty
and breach is a section permitting courts to craft no-duty exceptions
from those rules based on policy and principle. Plaintiffs' ability to
invoke these no-duty exceptions has steadily and encouragingly
increased with each Restatement draft.
In its first draft, the Restatement's rules exempted negligent
defendants from liability in cases of "special problems of principle or
policy that justify the withholding of liability" but afforded no similar
provision, in text or notes, to plaintiffs. 39
The second Restatement draft (which, due to a name change in
the Restatement project, is referred to as draft 1), acknowledged that
those who are in no special relationship that may affect duties owed-the default rule is that
everyone owes a duty of reasonable care to others to avoid physical harms.").
34. RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 3 cmt. b ("In
many situations the conduct of the actor imperils both the actor and third parties. In such
situations, all the risks foreseeably resulting from the actor's conduct are considered in
ascertaining whether the actor has exercised reasonable care."); cf. Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat,
Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Conflict, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 19, 25 (2000) ("By ignoring the effect of injurer's precaution on self-risk, American
common law systematically fails to analyze accurately the problem of joint risk."). If, however,
defendants' duty is to avoid conduct that poses risks of harm to others, defendant conduct that
threatens harm to the defendant, although included in the negligence inquiry, may still
encounter proximate cause problems.
35.

RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 3 cmt. b

(stating that "[t]he definition of negligence set forth in this section applies whether the issue is
the negligence of the defendant or the contributory negligence of the plaintiff').
36.

Id.

37.

See Wright, supra note 11, at 1141.

38.

RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 8 (giving

jurors the decision "as to the facts" and "as to whether the conduct lacks reasonable care").
39.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 6 (Discussion Draft, 1999).
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"no duty determinations" could "focus on the plaintiff."40 However, the
Restatement's black-letter rules, commentary, and illustrations all
offered a limited view of what those plaintiff no-duty determinations
might look like. In the black-letter rules, the Restatement's no-duty
section left room for courts to find that defendants had no duty "based
on judicial recognition of special problems of principle or policy." 41 No
equivalent black-letter provision through which courts might limit
plaintiffs' obligations based on considerations of principle or policy
was listed. 42 The Restatement commentary was also uneven. It viewed
no-duty determinations as "typically" relieving the defendant of
liability and only "on occasion" relieving the plaintiff of "the obligation
to act reasonably by way of self-protection." 43 Moreover, the
Restatement provided few citations to cases in which courts have
limited plaintiff, rather than defendant, obligations. Although the
Restatement set out a number of categories in which no-duty
determinations might be appropriate and highlighted a number of
cases in which courts had found no legal obligation, with few
exceptions the examples provided were cases in which courts found
44
that defendants, and not plaintiffs, had no duty.
In its most recent draft, however, the Restatement pays much
greater attention to plaintiff as well as defendant exceptions. The
Restatement's black-letter provision for exceptions from duty now
provides: "A court may determine that an actor has no duty or a duty
other than the ordinary duty of reasonable care." 45 The language of
the text no longer limits the application of these exceptions solely to
defendants.
If there were any doubt from the text itself, the Restatement
commentary now explicitly recognizes that "just as special problems of
policy may support a no-duty determination for a defendant, similar
concerns may support a no-duty determination for plaintiff

40.

RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 7 cmt. a.

41.

Id. § 7.

42. Id. Because section 8 says that seatbelt cases can be decided en masse, it may be that
this section can be used to create plaintiff no-duty rules. However, the Restatement does not
clearly delineate section 8 as a policymaking provision, and it is not clear why this particular
policy determination should be decided under the breach section rather than section 7's no-duty
provision.
43. RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 7 cmt. a.
44. Id. § 7 cmt. a & rep.'s note at 102-05 (listing the suicide cases and citing Ellen M.
Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1413
(1999), as the sole examples of plaintiff no-duty rules).
45.

added).

RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 2, supra note 9, § 7 (emphasis
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negligence." 46 In such cases, the commentary makes clear that a
court's exception would "eliminate the defense of comparative
negligence that otherwise would diminish plaintiffs recovery." 47 An
increased number of citations to cases invoking plaintiff no-duty rules
48
have also been provided.
This expanded Restatement support for judicial limits on
plaintiff obligations should encourage courts to explore more fully the
important principles and policies that at times warrant restriction of
plaintiff as well as defendant obligations. In anticipation of courts'
exploration of these principles and policies, the next part examines the
principles and policy factors that have influenced those court-created
limits to date.
III. COMPARATIVE FAULT AND ITS LIMITS
Comparative fault is ordinarily viewed as a jury question.
Cases in which comparative-fault defenses are decided as a matter of
law-in favor of plaintiffs or defendants-are often regarded as
"exceptional." 49 This view of judicial limits as the exception rather
than the rule appears stronger in comparative-fault than in
50
contributory-negligence jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, courts in comparative-fault jurisdictions endorse
a wide range of limits on plaintiff-fault defenses. Before addressing
some principle and policy factors that underlie these cases, this part
first addresses the form in which judicial limits appear, the role of
policy, and the rationale for acknowledging some limits.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. § 7 cmt. h.
Id.
Id. § 7 rep.'s note h.
Taylor-Rice v. State, 979 P.2d 1086, 1095 (Haw. 1999); see also MARSHALL S. SHAPO,

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW

31.02, at 128-29 (1999):

[C]ourts occasionally hold that, as a matter of law, a plaintiffs conduct may not be
said to be contributorily negligent ....
[and] courts often refuse to rule as a matter of
law that a plaintiff was contributorily negligent, reasoning that the jury should decide
whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable care under the circumstances.
50. States that have shifted from contributory to comparative negligence seem to impose
fewer limits after that shift. For example, in a Westlaw search, of 5800 cases that discuss
contributory negligence or comparative fault along with the phrase "as a matter of law" from the
1940s to present, only a few hundred cases were decided in the 1990s. Similarly, states that
currently have comparative fault rather than contributory negligence appear less likely to limit
plaintiff fault defenses. For example, in one search, 38 of 112 (thirty-four percent) recent state
supreme court opinions regarding such limits were from the five jurisdictions that retain
contributory negligence-Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and Washington D.C.

2003]

COMPARATIVE FAULT TO THE LIMITS

989

A. The Form of Limits
As a practical matter, cases limiting comparative-fault
defenses based on principle or policy can be difficult to unearth.
Courts generally have not recognized plaintiff baseline entitlements
through plaintiff no-duty terminology. Instead, courts ordinarily
recognize plaintiff entitlements through one of three methods: 1)
building plaintiff entitlements into general comparative-fault rules, 2)
holding that comparative-fault defenses do not apply to certain
categories of cases, or 3) employing case-specific limitations on
comparative-fault defenses even when broader principles underlie
those limits.
In the first set of cases, general rules incorporate categorical
limits on comparative-fault defenses. For example, some courts have
made plaintiff capacity a requirement for a successful comparativenegligence defense. 5 1 This requirement excuses plaintiffs from
exercising reasonable self-care when they lack the capacity to do so.
Similarly, the general rule that a defendant takes the plaintiff as he
finds her limits some comparative-fault claims. Under that rule, even
if a plaintiffs previous injury stemmed from her own fault-for
example, if the plaintiffs herniated disc stemmed from a prior car
accident in which she failed to stop at a red light-the defendant can
not litigate the plaintiffs causal negligence in a subsequent suit. 52
In the second instance, courts create category-specific rules
that limit the availability of comparative-fault defenses. For example,
a court may excuse plaintiff rescuers from liability for failure to
exercise reasonable care.5 3 Similarly, a court may adopt a rule that
certain institutions cannot plead the comparative negligence of a ward

51. See Ford v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 760 So. 2d 478, 485 (La. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that the actor's capacity is a part of the contributory-negligence requirement in
Louisiana, a comparative-fault jurisdiction). Cf. Hill v. Williams, 547 S.E.2d 472, 479 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2001) (stating that "[elvery person having the capacity to exercise ordinary care for his own
safety against injury is required by law to do so").
52. See Gross v. Lyons, 721 So. 2d 304, 307-08 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998) ("[I]f the injuries
sustained as a result of the two accidents are inseparable and cannot be apportioned, [the jury]
may return a verdict for the entire medical condition."); Washewich v. Le Fave, 248 So. 2d 670,
673 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that in contributory-negligence case, defendant who had
collision with plaintiff could be liable for full damages even if plaintiff negligently caused her
prior collision); Matsumoto v. Kaku, 484 P.2d 147, 150 (Haw. 1971) ("[W]here the preexisting
back ailment was not the result of any transaction involving other persons, we hold that such
preexisting condition should be treated no differently than from a condition brought about by
disease."); Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So. 2d 1002, 1005-06 (La. 1993) (holding that defendant who
exposed plaintiff to chlorine gas was liable for full damages of plaintiff who was smoker).
53. See, e.g.,
N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTR. 2:41 ('The law will not view an attempt to preserve
life as negligent unless the attempt, under the circumstances, was reckless.").
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who commits suicide. 54 Or it may reject comparative-fault defenses
raised in response to particular claims against defendants, as in
55
certain strict liability actions.
Courts create these categorical exceptions through a number of
doctrines. Some courts address the plaintiffs "duty" directly. 56 Other
courts that refuse to employ "duty" terminology may simply use a
parallel phrase such as "obligation."57 In certain types of cases, courts
may hold that comparative-fault defenses are simply not an available
defense, 58 or they may define the defendant's duty to include the very
59
purpose of protecting plaintiffs who lack care.
A final way that courts may bar comparative-fault defenses is
through case-specific language limiting the defenses even when the
limits stem from broader issues of policy or principle. For example, a
court may grant a plaintiffs motion in limine to exclude evidence of
comparative fault in cases in which those comparative-fault defenses
are particularly problematic. 60 Or a court may find a lack of
substantial evidence to support the finding of plaintiff fault, even
when a plaintiff arguably failed to use reasonable care for her own
well-being. 6 1 Courts also limit claims of comparative fault by
increasing the defendant's evidentiary burden to present actual
evidence of what others in the plaintiffs position would have done. 62 A
54. See, e.g., Myers v. County of Lake, 30 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 1994).
55. See, e.g., Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
56. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Luddy, 763 A.2d 826, 846 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); Brown v. Dibbell,
595 N.W.2d 358 (Wis. 1999); see also Jankee v. Clark County, 612 N.W.2d 287, 324-27 (Wis.
2000) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
57. Law v. Superior Court, 755 P.2d 1135, 1141 (Ariz. 1988) (noting that "[blecause in all
but the rarest situation nonuse of a seatbelt presents no foreseeable danger to others, it is
probably incorrect to conceptualize the seatbelt defense in terms of duty" but then characterizing
the need for plaintiff to wear a seatbelt as "part of the [plaintiffs] related obligation to conduct
oneself reasonably to minimize damages and avoid foreseeable harm to oneself').
58. See, e.g., Bell, 462 So. 2d at 171.
59. See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 751 A.2d 564, 589 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
60. See Harms v. Lab. Corp., 155 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (granting the
plaintiffs motion in limine to exclude evidence that she should have known of her own blood type
and RH factor from previous blood tests, in a case in which defendant lab negligently
misidentified plaintiffs blood as RH positive during her pregnancy, on the basis that "[any
evidence or reference to [plaintiffs] alleged contributory negligence would be highly prejudicial
with little-if any-probative value").
61. See, e.g., Greenwood v. Mitchell, 621 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Iowa 2001) ("[T]he defendant has
failed to introduce substantial evidence to prove that [plaintiffs] failure to continue his home
exercise program was unreasonable.").
62. DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of Christ, 890 P.2d 214, 231 (Colo. 1995) (rejecting
church's claim of comparative fault by boy sexually abused by priest since the church presented
no testimony as to what would have been reasonable conduct by the plaintiff); see also King v.
Clark, 709 N.E.2d 1043, 1048-49 (Ind. 1999) (Robb, J., dissenting) (arguing that there must be
evidence presented with respect to the reasonableness question).
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surprising number of courts have excluded comparative-negligence
defenses as a matter of law when the defendant did not produce
evidence to support the claim that other reasonable plaintiffs would
63
have done something differently than the plaintiff did.
B. The Role of Principleor Policy
Whether limits on comparative fault defenses are considered to
be a part of the comparative-negligence rules or as general or specific
exceptions to those rules, courts limit comparative-fault defenses for a
number of reasons. Of course, judges reject comparative-fault defenses
when a reasonable plaintiff would not have foreseen a risk 64 or taken
steps to reduce it 65-in short, cases in which no reasonable jury could
have found that the plaintiff breached an objective standard of
reasonable care for herself or others. In addition, courts reject
plaintiff-fault defenses when the plaintiffs alleged negligence was not
the actual 66 or proximate cause of the harm. 67 Such case-specific
limitations would be appropriately decided with or without a specific

63. Greenwood, 621 N.W.2d at 206 (holding that comparative-fault defense failed because
defendant did not present any evidence that others would have acted differently than the
plaintiff); Perales v. City of N.Y., 711 N.Y.S.2d 9, 10 (App. Div. 2000) (excluding a comparativefault defense due to lack of evidence); cf. Ponirakis v. Choi, 546 S.E.2d 707, 711 (Va. 2001)
(stating in a contributory-negligence case that there "[m]ust be more than a scintilla of evidence"
and that defendant had presented no evidence of how patients other than the plaintiff would
have acted).
64. Marple v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 505 N.W.2d 715, 717-18 (Neb. 1993) (finding that a
customer did not know of department store employee blindly pushing refrigerator down aisle).
65. This could be either because the plaintiff had no choice at all or because plaintiff did not
have a choice of a safer alternative. See Phillips v. United States, 743 F. Supp. 681, 686-87 (E.D.
Mo. 1990) (holding that a mechanic working on a vehicle stalled on a highway was not
comparatively negligent for injuries sustained when he was hit by a truck); Anderson v. Werner
Enters., Inc., 972 P.2d 806, 813-14 (Mont. 1998) (holding that a motorcyclist had no choice but to
be hit by a truck).
66. See, e.g., Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604, 627 (Neb. 2001) ("[N]othing
in the record indicates that Brandon's failure to return for the second December 29 interview
contributed to the county's failure to protect Brandon."); Townsend v. Legere, 688 A.2d 77 (N.H.
1997) (finding no evidence that plaintiff tripped on the sidewalk because she was a little woman
who could not control her big dog); Hunt v. Freeman, 550 N.W.2d 817, 818 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
(finding no evidence that plaintiff's consumption of part of a wine cooler affected her ability to
perceive and react); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 194 ("[Al causal link is as important in
dealing with P's conduct and P's harm as it is in dealing with D's conduct and P's harm.").
67. See Dan B. Dobbs, Accountability and Comparative Fault, 47 LA. L. REV. 939, 956 (1987)
(providing an example of a plaintiff who was negligent in walking onto a dark patio because she
might have fallen into the swimming pool, but who was instead hit by a runaway car that
entered the backyard); see also Skinner v. Ogallala Pub. Sch. Dist., 631 N.W.2d 510, 526 (Neb.
2001) (upholding trial court ruling that a plaintiff who failed to turn on the lights was not
contributorily negligent in a case in which the defendant left open a trap door in a school
classroom).
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mechanism for limiting comparative-fault defenses based on issues of
principle or policy. 68 However, judges also limit comparative-fault
defenses when a reasonable jury could have found that the plaintiffs
conduct posed an unreasonable risk and was the actual and proximate
69
cause of harm.
The line between no-breach cases, in which no reasonable jury
could have found plaintiff negligence, and no-duty cases, in which no
defense could be raised despite arguable plaintiff negligence, is a fine,
if not invisible, line. To illustrate, I have argued elsewhere that
citizens should have no duty to take reasonable care to protect
themselves from the threat of rape. 70 Two preeminent torts scholars
characterized this same argument in different ways. One wrote that
the proposed limit was a case in which "the plaintiffs autonomy or
citizenship rights permit her to ignore reasonable self-care," and
called it an entitlement or no-duty case. 71 The other wrote that the
plaintiffs autonomy or citizenship rights themselves should be seen as
defining reasonable self-care, such that the plaintiff would not have
been negligent. 72 Either of these characterizations might seem apt.
However, the terminology used to define the judicial limit is
not critical. Whether a court says that the plaintiffs conduct is
negligent but cannot go to the jury based on the plaintiffs policy-based
entitlements or that the plaintiffs conduct could not be considered
negligent in light of the plaintiffs entitlements, the court is
identifying and weighing the plaintiffs entitlements outside the
province of the jury. 73 This Article focuses on court-created limits
68. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. JURY INSTR. 14.91 (comparing the parties fault when the jury finds
"there was negligence on the part of the plaintiff which contributed as a cause of plaintiffs
injuries"), available at http://netlawlibraries.comjurinst/ji_014a.html#14.91. The Restatement of
Liabilityfor Physical Harm recognizes actual cause limits in its basic formula for liability, which
provides that liability only attaches when negligence causes harm. RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 6. If the Restatement makes no-duty exceptions
appropriate in particular cases and not just general categories, situations in which a plaintiffs
negligence is not the proximate cause of the harm may overlap with situations in which a
plaintiff has no duty.
69. See supra Part II.
70. Bublick, supra note 44, at 1477-90.
71. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 200, at 503.
72. Letter from Professor Oscar Gray (Apr. 27, 2001) ("The issue is not that rape victims are
entitled to be unreasonable by behaving freely-but that such behavior is not unreasonable.")
(emphasis in original) (on file with author).
73. See SHAPO, supra note 49, 32.01, at 131:
Sometimes more than one of these doctrinal labels, including contributory negligence,
various forms of implied assumption of risk, and no duty, may be appropriate to the
same behavior. Therefore, both advocates and judges should look to the functional
purpose of defenses involving the plaintiff's conduct in order to determine how best to
characterize the behavior. [;]
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based on underlying entitlements or principles, in whatever form
these arise. These limits suggest rules based on normative
considerations-that a plaintiff is not legally obligated to engage in or
refrain from certain kinds of conduct as a condition of full recovery.
C. TraditionalLimits
Over the last half century, many thoughtful authorities have
described the various categories of cases in which contributory-fault
defenses should be precluded. Dean Prosser focused on three
exceptions to the ordinary rule of contributory negligence:
contributory negligence was not a valid defense to intentional and
reckless torts, it could not be raised when the plaintiffs action was
"founded upon the defendant's violation of a statute"; and it did not
apply when the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
injury. 74 When the Restatement (Second) of Torts outlined limits on
contributory-fault defenses, it included these categories and added two
more: the defense of contributory negligence did not apply to claims of
strict liability or to the defendant's tort of nuisance. 75 Harper, James,
76
and Gray recognized this same set of exceptions.
A more recent account of comparative-fault defenses in
Professor Dobbs's new torts treatise declares that limits on plaintiff
fault as a defense to intentional and reckless torts still prevail in
comparative-negligence jurisdictions, although exceptions for last
clear chance very rarely survive the transition from contributory
negligence. 77 In addition, the treatise adds two lucid sections about a
range of risks that are allocated entirely to the defendant under either
78
comparative or contributory negligence.
The traditional categories for limiting comparative-fault
defenses shed much light on current case law. Most current limits on
comparative-fault defenses trace their roots to these historical
categories. However, the traditional categories also pose some
difficulties. One reason is change. For better or for worse,
comparative-fault and comparative-apportionment jurisdictions do not

see also Paul T. Hayden, Butterfield Rides Again: Plaintiff's Negligence as Superceding or Sole
Proximate Cause in Systems of Pure Comparative Responsibility, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 887, 901-07
(2000) (showing how courts use the notion of superseding cause to replace other forms of liability
limits).
74. Prosser, supra note 4, at 5-6.
75.

See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) TORTS §§ 479-84 (1984).

76.
77.
78.

HARPER ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 22.7-22.8, at 304-22.
DOBBS, supra note 7, §§ 207-08, at 517-23.
Id. § 200, at 500-03.
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always follow these traditional rules. Many courts have permitted
comparative-fault defenses to claims of strict liability, 79 and a few
80
have even permitted such defenses to reckless and intentional torts.
Even when change is less clear, the traditional categories can
be problematic. For instance, courts still limit plaintiff-fault defenses
in some cases in which the defendant violated a statute. 8 ' However,
courts appear to limit the comparative-fault defenses more often when
certain statutes are at issue, such as laws governing workplace
injuries or injuries to children, than they do with others. In a similar
vein, although it is true that courts limit plaintiff-fault defenses when
the defendant's very duty involves care for a negligent plaintiff, that
category begs the further question of when a defendant's duty is
considered to involve the care not merely of a plaintiff, but of a
negligent plaintiff. Moreover, limits to comparative-fault defenses
have appeared in a number of other circumstances less easily subject
82
to traditional categorization.
D. The Rationale for Limits
Although courts continue to limit some comparative-fault
defenses, they often provide little explanation for doing so. These
limits reflect a diverse range of principles and policies. Although a
complete taxonomy of potential normative influences is not possible,
there are certain identifiable situations in which the fairness,
deterrence, and compensation rationales for requiring comparative
fault are relatively unpersuasive, and in those situations a number of
exceptions tend to appear.

79. William J. McNichols, The Relevance of the Plaintiffs Misconduct in Strict Tort
Products Liability, the Advent of Comparative Responsibility, and the Proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 201, 234-35 (1994).
80. See, e.g., Martin v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 785 A.2d 16, 24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) (holding that court erred in refusing to apportion fault between rapist, rape victim, and
third party, and stating that "[tihe sole fact that [the rapist defendant] pled guilty to a crime
would also not bar apportionment"); see also Bonpua v. Fagan, 602 A.2d 287, 289-90 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1992) (holding that a defendant convicted of aggravated assault sufficiently alleged
comparative fault of plaintiff who called him a "faggot" in front of his girlfriend).
81. See, e.g., Steiner v. Mont. Dep't of Highways, 887 P.2d 1228 (Mont. 1994).
82. Jacobs v. Westgate, 766 So. 2d 1175, 1178-80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
landlord and neighbor who put plaintiffs property outside his apartment without plaintiffs
knowledge before it started to rain could not claim plaintiffs fault for the bad character which
prompted them to want to evict him or for plaintiffs failure to move property out of the rain
quickly enough); Richwalt v. Richfield Lakes Corp., 633 N.W.2d 418, 424-25 (Mich. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that a lifeguard could not assert plaintiffs comparative fault for his decision to go
swimming in the ocean despite his heart condition and prior heart surgery).
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Contributory negligence is often defined as "conduct on the
part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should
conform for his own protection."83 Comparative fault is simply
contributory negligence decided in incremental percentages.8 4 These
defenses are measured by an objective test-what a reasonable person
85
under like circumstances would do.
Comparative fault, like contributory negligence, is thought to
be animated by tort law concerns for corrective justice and
deterrence.8 6 Although the compensation role of comparative fault has
been emphasized less, an argument might also be made that
comparative fault furthers that objective as well.
Corrective-justice concerns are often considered the primary
rationale behind comparative-fault defenses.8 7 If the rationale behind
negligence law is essentially the golden rule-a person should take the
same care for others that she would have others take for her-the rule
of comparative fault appears to be something of a corollary-a person
must take as much care for herself as she would have others take for
her.8 8 Principles of fairness have been thought to require the plaintiff
to exercise the same level of care for herself that she demands from
others,8 9 or the same level of care that a person would will to be
universalized. 90 In addition, the plaintiffs obligation to care for herself

83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 75, § 463.
84. See DOBBS, supranote 7, § 201, at 503:
A rule of comparative fault "merely reduces the amount of the award to a plaintiff who
is chargeable with contributory fault. The plaintiffs conduct is not necessarily
different in the two cases. In a comparative-fault regime, the conduct may still be
called contributory negligence, but the legal effect of that contributory negligence is
different.
85. SHAPO, supra note 49, 31.01, at 127.
86. Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE
L.J. 697, 721-23 (1978).
87. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 16 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1693 (1995) (exploring carefully a number of rationales for limiting plaintiffs recovery
through the doctrine of contributory negligence); Schwartz, supra note 86, at 699 ("[E]conomics,
standing alone, furnishes no persuasive basis for any contributory negligence defense, but...
such a basis is adequately provided by reasons of fairness.").
88. Francis H. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARv. L. REV. 233, 255 (1908) ("[Tlhe
plaintiff can ask from others no higher respect for his rights than he himself pays to them."). A
different corollary might be that one must take as much care for herself as she takes for others.
89. Schwartz, supra note 86, at 722 (noting that to do otherwise would be an "uneven
application of the fault standard"); Dobbs, supra note 67; SHAPO, supranote 49, 31.03, at 130.
90. Cf. Curtis Bridgeman, Corrective Justice in Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive
Damages?, 56 VAND. L. REV. 237, 260 (2003) (discussing corrective-justice theories that stem from
Kant's moral philosophy).
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has been tied at times to the idea that a person owes herself as much
respect as she owes others. 91
As for deterrence, the "dominant" view is that accident
prevention "depends on the loss prevention efforts of both sides." 92 A
bilateral duty of care is thought to reduce the overall frequency and
severity of injuries. 93 Penalizing careless victims may promote victim
94
care.
Relatively little has been said about comparative fault with
respect to compensation. However, comparative fault can be thought
to increase compensation by giving more people access to recovery,
even if fewer of those people receive as great a recovery. 95 In addition,
if a broad notion of plaintiff comparative fault creates or reflects a
broad notion of defendant fault, comparative fault may increase
aggregate compensation to plaintiffs as a result of defendants' larger
liabilities. Moreover, it might be argued that comparative-fault
defenses further insurance goals by imposing, in effect, a risk
96
premium on negligent plaintiffs.
And yet, each of these rationales is open to criticism. In terms
of corrective justice, the existence or nonexistence of a contributorynegligence defense may not impact corrective-justice principles at all.
If Aristotle's idea of corrective justice requires only "the provision of
some remedy for a wrongful injury after the injury occurs," and the
details of compensation are not essential, 97 the presence or absence of
91. See Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 249 (David G. Owen ed., 1997); Bohlen, supra note 88, at 254 ("It
was manifestly unfair that ...any man should be required to take better care for others than
such persons are bound to take of themselves."); Schwartz, supra note 86, at 723 n.118; cf.
George Fletcher, In God's Image: The Religious Imperative of Equality Under Law, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1608, 1628-29 (1999) ("The basis of egalitarian jurisprudence should not be the state and its
interests but, rather, the intrinsic equality of all persons created in God's image.").
92. EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 190 (citing Mark Grady, Common Law of Strategic Behavior:
Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15 (1988)); see also RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124 (1990); Schwartz, supra note 86, at 699 (arguing that law and
economics scholarship has "strongly endorsed the idea of a contributory negligence defense"). But
see Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) (concluding that in certain circumstances "a simple
negligence rule with no defense can induce efficient self-selection").
93. EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 19-91; Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic
Case for Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067, 1081-82 (1986).
94. SHAPO, supra note 49, 31.03, at 130,
33.02, at 138 n.7 (noting that passing no-fault
insurance laws is associated with a rise in fatal accidents); Schwartz, supra note 86, at 704
("[Tihe law can discourage people from engaging in conduct that involves an unreasonable risk to
their own safety ....).
95. See SHAPO, supra note 49, 33.03, at 142; Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New
Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 868-69 (1996).
96. Cf. Simons, supra note 87, at 1747.
97. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 322-23 (1990).
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a contributory-fault defense does not support or offend correctivejustice principles. With respect to deterrence it is not at all clear
whether comparative fault promotes safety in the personal injury
context.98 Even without comparative fault, the plaintiff already has
incentives to prevent harm to herself and, at the margin, may already
have too many incentives for self care. 99 In terms of compensation,
comparative fault may not only leave plaintiffs without adequate
resources to pay the cost of their injuries, but also may prevent them
from taking advantage of the loss-spreading function of insurance for
all or part of the claim. 100
These general criticisms of comparative fault have not shaken
courts' or commentators' general support for that doctrine. However,
in particular types of cases, the justifications for the comparative-fault
doctrine seem particularly suspect.
Implicit within the corrective-justice and deterrence rationales
for comparative fault are two critical prerequisites-that there was a
better course of action for the plaintiff to choose and that she should
have made that choice ex ante. "The very essence of contributory
negligence is that the plaintiff has misconducted himself, that he has
done or omitted to do something which under the circumstances of the

98. Schwartz, supra note 86, at 721 ("[Tlhere is inadequate reason to believe that any
contributory negligence rule is a good idea in safety terms; the traditional rule, moreover,
appears to be a distinctly bad idea."); Prosser, supranote 4, at 4:
It has been said that the comparative-fault rule is intended to discourage accidents,
by denying recovery to those who fail to use proper care for their own safety; but the
assumption that the speeding motorist is, or should be, meditating on the possible
failure of a lawsuit for his possible injuries lacks all reality, and it is quite as
reasonable to say that the rule promotes accidents by encouraging the negligent
defendant.
99. The plaintiff already retains liability for whatever accidents are caused to her by
another without negligence or for those accidents for which the defendant has no duty or
immunity. See EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 8.5, at 197 ("[T]he general adoption of negligence
liability imposes on P the risk of these unavoidable accidents as a matter of social policy.");
Simons, supra note 87, at 1702-03 (referring to this result as plaintiff strict responsibility);
Schwartz, supra note 86, at 710-11 (noting that "[t]o the extent that the victim cannot predict
that his accident will involve the tort liability of another party, his original incentive for careful
conduct remains fully in effect" and that plaintiff damages fall short of full compensation because
of legal fees, experience of litigation, and pain and suffering). Furthermore, the plaintiffs
interests in her own safety stem from concern for her well-being, not simply from concern about
her inability to recover for her losses in economic terms. See Schwartz, supra note 86, at 712
("[T]he plaintiff is the biological victim of the accident. Hence the plaintiff has a strong 'firstparty' incentive to prevent the accident without regard to tort liability rules.").
100. GuIDO CALEBRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 279-81 (1970) (noting that unless
comparative fault "were administered with a fine eye to who the best loss spreader was, many
heavy unspread losses would remain").

998

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:977

case a reasonably prudent man would not have done or omitted to
10 1
do."
When no better choice of conduct was available, the rationales
for comparative fault would seem to fail. In many no-breach cases, it is
10 2
easy to see that the plaintiff did not have a better choice of conduct.
However, in other cases, it is difficult to determine the best course of
conduct for the plaintiff. Usually, the jury determines what the
plaintiffs best course of conduct would have been. But when the
process of determining whether the plaintiff had a better choice is
itself likely to impose independent harms on the parties, the litigation,
or its social message, courts may prefer to resolve the liability issue
without it. Similarly, when plaintiffs course of conduct touches on her
fundamental, sometimes constitutional, rights, courts may be wary
about letting juries decide whether the plaintiff made the prudent
choice. Moreover, when the plaintiffs choice risks harm only to herself
and a reasonable person might make the choice either way, courts
may want to leave the reasonableness of that choice to the plaintiffs
judgment rather than to jury decision.
Even when there was a better choice of conduct available, the
second fundamental premise of comparative fault is that the plaintiff,
like other reasonable persons, should have made that choice ex ante.
But if the plaintiff was incapable of making that reasonable choice
because of incapacity, or because of structural factors that predictably
hamper plaintiffs' efforts, her failure of care is less likely to trigger
accountability and deterrence concerns. In situations in which
plaintiffs are unable to care for themselves, their failure to use
reasonable care does not reflect a lack of self-respect. 10 3 Likewise,
holding a plaintiff responsible for comparative fault does not remove
her incapacity or the structural barriers that prevented her from
compliance with the standard of reasonable care in the first place.
Accordingly, exceptions to comparative-fault defenses may be
not only predictable, but also desirable, when the plaintiff cannot
make a favored choice because she cannot take care for herself, cannot
take as effective care for herself as others can take for her, or is
thought to deserve some kind of care in spite of her own negligence. In

101. Bohlen, supra note 88, at 247.
102. For example, when the plaintiff incurs larger damages than might be expected from the
defendant's negligence because of plaintiffs preexisting condition, tort law commonly finds that
the defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds her. See, e.g., Benn v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 537, 538
(Iowa 1994) (requiring the defendant to take his plaintiff as he finds him and pay for "harm an
ordinary person would not have suffered").
103. Wright, supra note 91, at 269-70 (stating that plaintiff contributory negligence is a
question of whether "the plaintiff failed properly to respect one's own humanity").
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addition, exceptions should be considered when the process of
determining whether the plaintiff has taken care is likely to be
harmful in itself, raises significant normative concerns, or invades the
plaintiffs autonomy to make decisions about conduct that poses risks
to self alone.
E. Principleand Policy Factors
For the purpose of this Article, I will explore six principle and
policy factors: 1) plaintiff incapacity-when the plaintiff is incapable
of total or partial self-care; 2) structural safety-when the plaintiff is
less capable of self-care than is the defendant due to positional or
situational factors; 3) role definition-when the plaintiff is capable of
self-care, but the defendant must care for a negligent plaintiff due to
contractual or social obligations; 4) process-related harms-when the
process of asking about plaintiff care will be destructive in itself; 5)
fundamental values-when the very issue of a plaintiff's
reasonableness implicates fundamental, sometimes constitutional,
values; and 6) autonomy and self-risk judgment-when evaluating the
reasonableness of plaintiff self-care encroaches on the plaintiffs
autonomy not to act or to act in ways that do not risk harm to others.
Before exploring these principle and policy factors, three
caveats are necessary. First, my claim is that when courts do limit
comparative-fault defenses, it is typically because of these factors. My
claim is not that courts limit comparative-fault defenses whenever
these factors are present. Second, these principle and policy factors
are not mutually exclusive, and a given comparative-fault defense may
suggest several, if not all, of them.10 4 And third, my goal is not to
convince readers that any particular category is normatively justified,
but simply to show that courts have crafted these exceptions in a
number of situations in which there are principled reasons to consider
them.
1.

Plaintiff Incapacity

At times, courts limit comparative-fault defenses when the
plaintiff lacks the capacity to exercise reasonable care for her own

104. For example, limiting claims of comparative fault as a defense to intentional torts may
serve process, freedom, and autonomy considerations.
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safety and when the plaintiffs incapacity is recognizable and socially
accepted. 105
The relevance of plaintiff capacity to comparative-fault
defenses is most apparent when the plaintiff lacks any ability to care
for himself, as in the case of an infant. The New York case Rider v.
Speaker is illustrative. 10 6 In Rider, fourteen-month-old Michael
Clarkin, Jr. and two other children were traveling in a car with
Michael's babysitter and her sister. One of the children was placed in
the car's single child-safety seat. Michael and another child were
placed directly in the car's backseat, possibly secured by a seatbelt.
While the babysitter's sister was driving, the car collided with a
delivery van, and Michael sustained serious injuries.
Michael's parents sued both drivers and the babysitter for
negligence. As an affirmative defense, each of the three defendants
claimed that Michael's failure to wear a seatbelt or to sit in a child
safety seat constituted contributory negligence or failure to mitigate
damages.10 7 Michael's parents brought a motion to strike the
affirmative defense, and the court granted the motion to strike with
respect to all three defendants. "As a matter of law," the court wrote,
"a 14-month-old is incapable of contributory negligence."10 8 This result
pertained to all three defendants even though Michael had no prior
relationship to the defendant van driver and even though the driver
apparently did not have any knowledge of the child's presence in the
car. 109
Other cases reach the same result. For example, a two-year-old
plaintiff who eats lead paint chips cannot be charged with the failure
to use reasonable care. 110
The rationale for this exception from comparative fault for
young children seems obvious to judges, who generally do not
elaborate on the principles that support it. The incapacity of very
young plaintiffs affects both the accountability and deterrence
rationales for comparative fault. An infant plaintiff who lacks any
ability to choose an alternative course of conduct (like buckling a
seatbelt), also lacks moral fault for failing to live up to the objective

105. Cf.Anita Bernstein, The Communities That Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 CHI.KENT L. REV. 735 (2002) (arguing that negligence law relies on communities to buttress its
authority).
106. 692 N.Y.S.2d 920 (App. Div. 1999).
107. Before disposition of the case, one of the three defendants-the babysitter-withdrew
her defense. Id. at 921.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 922.
110. Lopez v. No Kit Realty Co., 679 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (App. Div. 1998).
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standard of care as well as the ability to be deterred from his
conduct.'1 1 Traditional rationales for comparative fault therefore do
not merit application of the comparative-fault doctrine in this
situation.
Plaintiffs incapacity claims are particularly strong in the
context of infancy because of the natural dependency of young
children1 12 and because social norms recognize greater obligations for
the care of children in light of that dependency. 13 Accordingly,
resolving these cases by reference to the single issue of defendant's
negligence is likely to be more consistent with normative
understandings of fault than are resolutions reached by reference to
both defendant and plaintiff negligence. Accommodations for
incapacity may well be stronger when the party invoking them is a
14
plaintiff rather than a defendant.'
But rejecting comparative-fault defenses, even in this context,
is not without potential controversy. If comparative-fault defenses are
not based on an individual's moral fault but on the fault of failing to
meet an objective standard of reasonable care, failure to comply with
the standard of care may be all that is morally required. Moreover, to
the extent that comparative fault operates as a limit on the
defendant's liability-limiting defendant's liability to only those
damages that would have occurred if the other party had exercised
reasonable care-it might seem unfair to require a defendant to pay a
greater share of the damages because the unbuckled passenger in the
car he hit happened to be a child."1 5

111. See Chu v. Bowers, 656 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) ("[T]he primary rationale for
[the tender-years] rule is the belief that children under the age of seven are incapable of
recognizing and appreciating risk and are therefore deemed incapable of negligence as a matter
of law.").
112. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).

113. Children are often considered protected by the state, not simply reliant on themselves
and their parents for safety. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972).
114. There are structural reasons that courts may use incapacity to limit comparative
negligence defenses more often than they do with negligence claims. In cases of plaintiff
incapacity, there is always another negligent party-the defendant-or the comparative-fault
claim could not be raised. In cases in which the defendant suffers from an incapacity, a
nonnegligent party may have been injured. When incapacitated defendants injure negligent
plaintiffs, courts may curtail those defendants' liability more readily as well. See Creasy v. Rusk,
730 N.E.2d 659, 667-68 (Ind. 2000) (denying claim brought against patient suffering from
Alzheimer's disease).
115. What is fair for the plaintiff to receive in damages may differ from what it is fair for the
defendant to pay. George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Law Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV.
537, 540-42 (1972). Moreover, the plaintiffs fault may impact the defendant's fault. The
defendant's conduct therefore may appear more blameworthy not just as a result of his own
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And yet, courts seem quite willing to impose greater liability on
16
defendants in light of a young plaintiffs lack of subjective ability,
(although in some cases the child's damages may be reduced through
other avenues). 117 As one court wrote,
[T]here is something to be said for requiring citizens to assume total responsibility if
their negligence causes injury to a child. While the child may have acted carelessly or
thoughtlessly, it is in the nature of children to be careless and thoughtless on occasion,
and society must be ever aware of the need to exercise extraordinary caution when
1 18
children are present.

It may be argued that infants-who are incapable of caring for
their own needs-are the only group of plaintiffs for whom incapacity
warrants a complete limit on comparative-fault defenses. The draft
Restatement takes this position. Moreover, current case law most
clearly excludes this group of plaintiffs from comparative fault.
Nevertheless, case law and principle also suggest that other
people whose total or near-total incapacity precludes their self-care
might be exempted from comparative fault as well. 119 In a number of
cases, people institutionalized with dementia have been found
incapable of comparative fault with respect to their caregivers. 120 It is
not clear whether these cases are based solely on plaintiff incapacity,
as in this category, or whether they are also based on structural safety
concerns outlined in the next section. There are few cases in which
someone other than a caregiver has raised a comparative-fault claim
against an incapacitated plaintiff, so there is little opportunity to test
the rationale. In one of the few cases on point, a speeding driver hit a
woman who was suffering from Alzheimer's disease and had wandered
negligence, but as a result of his negligence plus the resulting harmful consequence such that
some sort of downward adjustment seems fair.
116. See Chu, 656 N.E.2d at 439; Stinespring v. Natorp Garden Stores, Inc., 711 N.E.2d
1104, 1107 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) ("The amount of care required to discharge a duty to a child of
tender years is necessarily greater than that required to discharge a duty to an adult.").
117. For example, in some jurisdictions, the child's guardian could be sued for negligent
supervision. Y.H. Invs., Inc. v. Godales, 690 So. 2d 1273, 1277-78 (Fla. 1997). In certain
circumstances, this doctrine appears to revive the discredited notion of imputed negligence.
Accordingly, some courts have refused to assign fault to the child's parent when that assignment
would diminish the child's ability to recover from other negligent defendants. See Crotta v.
Home Depot, Inc., 732 A.2d 767, 771-72 (Conn. 1999) (holding that parental immunity bars
parent from being joined as a third-party defendant or assigned a percentage of fault in injury
suits brought on behalf of the child).
118. Chu, 656 N.E.2d at 439.
119. See Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1060-61 (Utah 1989) (stating that
"[t]hose who are insane are incapable of contributory negligence" but concluding that a mentally
impaired patient could be found ten percent liable in sexual misconduct by her therapist).
120. Cf. Bochenek v. State, 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 20, 25 (1977) ("It is also clear that the deceased was
mentally incompetent at the time of the accident, and was unable to care for himself. We
therefore find that he was incapable of contributory negligence.").
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into the street. The state trial court wrote that a departure from the
ordinary comparative-fault standard would be required in light of the
plaintiffs incapacity. 121 But rather than resolve that difficult question,
the state supreme court rendered it moot with a ruling that there was
insufficient evidence that the defendant, who allegedly was speeding
and had failed to sound his horn when he saw the woman in the
12 2
street, breached his duty of reasonable care.
As a matter of principle, there seems little reason to limit
comparative-fault defenses raised against young people incapable of
123
self-care but not against others with serious incapacities.
Administrative ease may be a practical concern, however. 124 Not only
do infant plaintiffs lack the capacity to meet the standard of care, but
they also do so in a way that is easy to judge categorically (although as
children get older, this classification becomes more difficult to apply).
Accordingly, it is not surprising that, in comparative-fault claims
against other arguably dependent persons, courts seem to rely upon
demonstrable
indicia of incapacity for self-care
such as
institutionalization. 125 Perhaps courts would be more willing to bar
comparative-fault defenses in cases in which a person's incompetence
had been adjudicated in prior proceedings.
In cases of partial incapacity, in which the plaintiff is capable
of some but not necessarily full self-care, as with older children and
mentally or physically disabled adults, and in cases of temporary
incapacity, as with emergency doctrine cases, courts have generally
limited but not barred comparative-fault defenses. 126 In these cases, a
case-by-case judgment about each plaintiffs capacity to make

121. Sharbino v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 690 So. 2d 73, 78 (La. Ct. App. 1997)
(noting that the trial court held that the plaintiff "was not contributorily (or comparatively)
negligent because she acted as a reasonably prudent person with senile dementia").
122. Id.
123. See Bohlen, supra note 88, at 253 ('The courts are the last resort of him who not merely
does not, but cannot, protect himself."); Schwartz, supra note 86, at 714 (stating that accident
risk varies by age and that less care can be expected from the young and the elderly).
124. Perhaps this is why courts have drawn many rules of thumb, such as the tender-years
doctrine. See Chu v. Bowers, 656 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) (endorsing a bright-line
rule rather than a test of an individual child's capacity on the basis that such a rule fosters
"predictable results and judicial economy").
125. Compare Sharbino, 690 So. 2d at 78, with Fields v. Senior Citizens Ctr., Inc., 528 So. 2d
573, 581 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a nursing home patient suffering from mental
confusion should be held to a "relaxed standard of care").
126. See, e.g., Smith v. Lebanon Valley Auto Racing Inc., 598 N.Y.S.2d 858, 859-60 (App. Div.
1993) (noting that "a plaintiff with diminished mental capacity 'should not be held to any greater
degree of care for his own safety than that which he is capable of exercising' " but holding that a
"borderline mentally retarded" racetrack patron who was injured in the pit area may have had
the mental capacity to understand the warning to leave the spot where he was standing).
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particular choices might serve accountability and deterrence
principles. However, the courts' use of semisubjective standards may
reflect the difficulty of making individualized determinations of
capacity.
On the other hand, when courts view the plaintiffs incapacity
as flowing from a voluntary choice-as in the case of persons who are
voluntarily intoxicated or have chosen not to medicate a psychiatric
127
condition-they are unlikely to carve out exceptions.
2.

Structural Safety

While courts may limit comparative-fault defenses in some
cases solely based, on the plaintiffs incapacity, in other cases the limit
is based on a combination of plaintiff incapacity and the defendant's
special abilities and relationship to the plaintiff. Specifically, in a
number of cases, courts have limited plaintiff comparative-fault
defenses when the defendant was in a better position to exercise care
for the plaintiffs interests than was the plaintiff herself. These cases
involve 1) plaintiffs who are relatively incapable of self-care due to
personal or situational factors, 2) defendants who have greater
maturity, information, or control and can foresee that some people in
plaintiffs' position will not exercise self-care, and 3) relationships of
trust or care between the parties that require the defendants to
128
exercise care for the plaintiffs' protection.
a. Experience Differentials
Courts may prevent defendants from raising comparative-fault
defenses when immature plaintiffs are involved with dangerous
instrumentalities or adult activities outside the plaintiffs ordinary
experience.
An example of a limit on a comparative-fault defense in the
case of an immature plaintiff engaging in an adult activity arises in
the case of Doe v. Brainerd InternationalRaceway, Inc. 129 In Brainerd,
a sixteen-year-old runaway entered the Brainerd raceway grounds
127. Baldwin v. Omaha, 607 N.W.2d 841, 850-51 (Neb. 2000) (holding that a mentally ill
arrestee shot by police who disregarded standard operating procedures for dealing with persons
with mental illness could claim comparative fault of plaintiff who failed to take his antipsychotic
medication).
128. Dobbs, supra note 67, at 960-62 (formulating elements of a principle under which
duty/risk analysis is appropriate after comparative fault when the plaintiff is "in a class of
persons who cannot protect itself from the risk in question," the risk is "nonreciprocal," and the
defendant has "knowledge or reason to know of the plaintiffs disability").
129. 514 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) [hereinafter Brainerd1].
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using a pass obtained by another person. Once on the grounds, she
130
ingested drugs and alcohol and participated in a wet T-shirt contest.
The wet T-shirt contest degenerated into a sexual performance that
included complete nudity and digital and oral penetration of Doe and
other women in front of a predominantly male crowd of more than two
thousand people. 131 The contest/performance lasted approximately one
hour and was videotaped by spectators. 132 Although the raceway and
its security service had ample notice of raucous behavior including wet
T-shirt contests and nudity at the raceway during previous Quaker
State races and had a stated goal of preventing wet T-shirt contests,
the raceway's security service did nothing to prevent, and possibly
approved, that activity in advance.1 33 Furthermore, although violent
acts were common at the raceway, including "explosion of pipe bombs,
the burning of cars, and sexual molestation-even of minors," security
personnel did nothing to prevent this violence.1 34 In fact, security
personnel refused to enter the most dangerous area of the raceway,
35
which they referred to as "the zoo," even to accompany paramedics.'
Security officers simply warned paramedics that "they might be killed
if they ventured into the area after dark.' 36
After Doe's public sexual performance, which led to the
criminal conviction of two organizers, Doe sued the raceway and the
security service for negligence. 137 She argued that the defendants were
guilty of negligence per se for violating Minnesota's statutory duty not
to use a minor in a sexual performance.' 38 In addition, she claimed
that defendants breached their common law duty to use reasonable
139
care to protect her from foreseeable criminal acts of third parties.
The Minnesota appellate court agreed with both of the plaintiffs
theories.' 40 Further, the court held that "there can be no contributory
negligence as a matter of law," because the Minnesota statute banning
sexual performances was intended "for the protection of a limited class
of persons from their inability to protect themselves."'141 That class
130. Id. at 814.

131. Id. at 815; Doe v. Brainerd Int'l Raceway, Inc., 533 N.W.2d 617, 619 (Minn. 1995)
[hereinafter BrainerdIll.
132. Brainerd1, 514 N.W.2d at 815.
133. Id. at 815, 817 n.3.
134. Id. at 815.
135. Id.

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
BrainerdII, 533 N.W.2d at 620.
Brainerd1, 514 N.W.2d at 816.
Id. at 817.

140. Id. at 817-18.

141. Id. at 817 (quoting Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 811 (Minn. 1981)).
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was to be protected from "their own inexperience, lack of judgment,
inability to protect themselves or resist pressure, or tendency toward
142
negligence."
On review, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court not only
overruled the appellate court's decision that the raceway and security
company had a duty that could not be limited by comparative fault,
but also ruled that the defendants had no duty to the plaintiff. 143 The
court's no-duty ruling for the defendants was based largely on the
plaintiffs own contributory negligence. According to the court, the
defendants did not have a duty to protect plaintiff "from the very harm
44
that she actively created."'
These appellate decisions represent two very different views of
defendants' responsibility to minors who participate in adult
activities. The appellate court's decision represents a more protective
view of plaintiffs, even when their conduct is patently unreasonable,1 45
while the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision takes a more
judgmental stance toward minors who engage in unreasonable adult
activities.
The protective view through which courts limit comparativefault defenses when an immature plaintiff is involved in adult activity
reflects a belief that the safety of children will be promoted by placing
legal responsibility on the more mature and experienced party. Even if
some people in the plaintiffs situation can take reasonable care for
their safety, immature plaintiffs as a group cannot reliably do so in
the way that a more experienced or mature defendant could. 46 For
this reason, the defendant's obligation may be to take care for even a
negligent plaintiff. In some ways, this exception parallels the draft
Restatement's exception for children who engage in adult activities.
When a child's engagement in adult activities risks harm to others,
more care is required. 4 7 Conversely, when a child's engagement in

142. Id. at 817 (quoting Zerby v. Warren, 210 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 1973)).
143. Brainerd I, 533 N.W.2d at 622. At times, courts such as this one repackage plaintiff
comparative-fault defenses as claims that the defendant had no duty or that the plaintiff was the
superceding cause of the harm. See also Stinespring v. Natorp Garden Stores, Inc., 711 N.E.2d
1104, 1107 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (stating that "[w]hat the trial court did, in the guise of
causation, was to find that the children themselves were negligent," and holding that this
reformulation was inappropriate).
144. BrainerdII, 533 N.W.2d at 622.
145. See Stinespring, 711 N.E.2d at 1107 ("Children of tender years, and youthful persons
generally, are entitled to a degree of care proportioned to their inability to foresee and avoid the
perils that they may encounter.") (quoting DiGildo v. Caponi, 247 N.E.2d 732, 734 (Ohio 1969)).
146. See N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Perron, 777 A.2d 151, 159-60 (Vt. 2001) (discussing ways in which
the law protects minors from their own poor choices).
147. RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 10(c).
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adult activities risks the child's own safety, others owe a greater
degree of care to her.
A number of courts have adopted the Minnesota appellate
court's more protective view of minors in cases involving sexual
relationships between adults and minors. Many courts have limited
claims of child comparative fault in cases involving sexual
relationships between children and clergy, teachers, or other trusted
adults, even if the child took steps to maintain the abusive
relationship over a period of years.' 48 These limitations hold true even
when the child is a teenager. 14 9 In these cases, defenses of child
comparative fault are barred even when those defenses are raised by a
third party, such as a church, not by the adult who had sex with the
child. 150 Courts have also limited comparative-fault defenses when the
young plaintiff was involved with a dangerous instrumentality rather
151
than an adult activity.
b. Education and Information Differentials
Courts have limited comparative-fault defenses in cases in
which the defendant has superior information and training relative to
the plaintiff. For example, in several professional malpractice
contexts, courts limit plaintiff comparative-fault defenses on the basis
148. DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of Christ, 890 P.2d 214, 231 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995)
(rejecting church claim that boy who had been sexually abused could be expected to report
instances of abuse in such situations), rev'd on other grounds, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1997);
Hutchison v. Luddy, 763 A.2d 826, 847-49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding that a church that was
negligent in hiring, supervising, and retaining sexually abusive priest could not claim
comparative fault of boy for continuing to see priest despite ongoing abuse); see also Dunlea v.
Dappen, 924 P.2d 196, 200 (Haw. 1996) (holding that in an incest case, father could not claim
comparative fault of daughter). But see Beul v. ASSE Int'l, Inc., 233 F.3d 441, 450-51 (7th Cir.
2000) (upholding assignment of forty-one percent of fault to teenage foreign exchange student
from Germany who was repeatedly raped by the father of her host family).
149. Landreneau v. Fruge, 676 So. 2d 701, 707 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
teacher/coach and bus driver could not claim that sixteen-year-old was at fault for molestation).
150. DeBose, 890 P.2d at 231.
151. See In re Buss, No. 95-CV-1587, 1999 WL 33246480, at *2-3 (Ill. Ct. Cl. 1999) (holding
that a drunk driver could not claim, as a complete defense, comparative fault of underage
passenger who knew that driver was drunk); cf. Jarrett v. Woodward Bros., Inc., 751 A.2d 972,
985-87 (D.C. App. 2000) (holding that contributory negligence is not available as a defense to a
violation of the Alcohol Beverage Control Act and that to hold otherwise would defeat the
purpose of the statute); Brainerd I, 514 N.W.2d at 817 ("Types of statutes which would be
exceptions to the general rule [allowing the defense of contributory negligence] include (1) child
labor statutes; (2) statutes for the protection of intoxicated persons, and (3) statutes prohibiting
sale of dangerous articles to minors.") (citing Zerby, 210 N.W.2d at 62); Dobbs, supra note 67, at
257 (providing, as an example, that comparative fault should not be allowed when a farmer
allows a disabled adult to use farm machinery). This tort doctrine bears some similarity to the
contract doctrine that minors have the capacity to enter into contracts concerning necessities,
but not other contracts.
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that the defendant professional is better able to protect the plaintiffs
interests through the exercise of professional skill and judgment. 152 A
doctor is better situated than a patient to make decisions about the
patient's health care. 15 3 Similarly, a lawyer can better safeguard a
154
client's legal interests than the client herself.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court case of Brown v. Dibbell is
illustrative. 155 In that case, the plaintiff, whose twin sister had died of
breast cancer, had a prophylactic bilateral mastectomy. 156 The surgery
turned out poorly, and the plaintiff was dissatisfied with her
postoperative appearance and loss of sensation. 157 The plaintiff sued
her doctors for failure to obtain informed consent. 158 She charged that
the doctor should have accurately advised her of her postoperative
appearance, of other treatment options, and of her risks of developing
breast cancer. 5 9 In addition, plaintiff filed a medical malpractice
claim for the doctors' negligent decision to perform the potentially
60
unnecessary surgery. 1
In their defense, the doctors alleged that the patient was
contributorily negligent. 16' The doctors argued that the patient
breached a "duty to exercise ordinary care for [her own] health and
well-being" in three ways. 62 First, the plaintiff did not provide
truthful and accurate information about her personal and family
medical history; in particular, she misrepresented that her mother
had had breast cancer. 6 3 Second, plaintiff did not "ascertain the truth
or completeness of the information presented by the doctor," "ask

152. Gorski v. Smith, 812 A.2d 683, 702 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (permitting comparative-fault
claims in attorney malpractice actions but listing several types of comparative-fault claims that
would not be permitted).
153. Brown v. Dibbell, 595 N.W.2d 358, 369-70 (Wis. 1999) (holding that a woman who
underwent potentially unnecessary mastectomy did not have affirmative duty to ascertain
completeness of information furnished by doctor).
154. Tarleton v. Arnstein & Lehr, 719 So. 2d 325, 330-31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding
that an attorney who gave faulty advice about meaning of release clause in divorce settlement
could not claim client's comparative fault in failing to understand language of release since
clients can rely on attorney's expertise); see infra note 216; see also Larry Garrett, Comparative
Fault in Legal Malpracticeand Insurance Bad Faith:An Argument for Symmetry, 21 REV. LITIG.

663 (2002) (arguing that comparative fault should not be a defense to legal malpractice).
155. 595 N.W.2d 358 (Wis. 1999).
156. Id. at 363-64.
157. Id. at 364.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 361.
162. Id. at 367.
163. Id. at 368.
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questions of the doctor," or "independently seek information."'16 4
Specifically, she "failed to ask for brochures about mastectomies or
photographs showing what patients look like after this kind of
surgery." 165 Finally, plaintiff did not make a reasonable choice among
alternative modes of medical treatment when she chose to have
166
bilateral mastectomies rather than periodic mammograms.
Writing for the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Justice Abrahamson
defined the patient's duty of care for her own well-being. The court
accepted the defendants' argument that a patient "must tell the truth
and give complete and accurate information about personal, family
and medical histories to the doctor." 167 However, in repudiation of the
defendants' argument, the court held that "a patient's duty to exercise
ordinary care does not impose on the patient an affirmative duty to
ascertain the truth or completeness of the information presented by
the doctor; nor does a patient have an affirmative duty to ask
questions or independently seek information."1 68 Similarly, the court
held that a patient is not guilty of contributory negligence when she
16 9
chooses "a viable medical mode of treatment presented by a doctor."
The court's explanation for its acceptance of some of the
doctor's comparative-fault claims but not others primarily rested on
the patient's superior information with respect to her personal medical
history and the doctor's superior information with respect to medical
treatment options and risks. As the court wrote, "[i]t is the doctor who
possesses medical knowledge and skills," while "a patient is not in a
1 70
position to know treatment options and risks."
A limit on plaintiff comparative-fault defenses in cases in
which the defendant is better able to care for the plaintiff by virtue of
special skill or training can be considered an entitlement to rely upon
certain skilled professionals. 171 Such an entitlement might serve to
promote better decisions as the primary duty of care will rest with the
person possessing the most skill and ability to choose the safest option
to protect the plaintiffs interests. Plaintiffs entitlement can also be
164. Id. at 369.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

370.
368.
369.
370.

170. Id. at 369-70.

171. Id. at 362 ("We conclude that a patient usually has the right to rely on the professional
skills and knowledge of a doctor."); see also White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tenn. 1998)
(holding that an osteopathic physician cannot use a patient's suicide as a defense if that suicide
was a foreseeable risk of the osteopath's advice to patient's wife to add an alcohol-aversion drug
to the patient's diet secretly).
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considered an entitlement not to be completely self-reliant, but rather
to depend on others when making some decisions. A plaintiff need not
acquire the medical, legal, financial, and other education required to
challenge a professional's judgment. 172 Without such an entitlement,
the plaintiff would be required to second-guess the advice provided by
learned professionals. 173 Moreover, even if the plaintiff possesses the
education to challenge a professional's judgment, she may expect to
have the work performed competently by a skilled professional hired
for that purpose. 174 The plaintiffs legally recognized reliance interest
175
might be considered part of an implicit contract between the parties.
As in Brown, limits on comparative-fault defenses in
professional malpractice cases are generally confined to areas in which
a professional is better situated to care for the plaintiff than is the
plaintiff herself. In areas in which the plaintiff has better information
than the professional, the plaintiffs conduct is generally open to
scrutiny, 176 unless a reasonable person in the plaintiffs situation
would not appreciate the importance of that information without
professional advice or questioning. 77 In addition, a professional does
172. Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 370 ("[A] patient is not in a position to know treatment options
and risks and, if unaided, is unable to make an informed decision."); see also Rowe v. Sisters of
the Pallottine Missionary Soc'y, 560 S.E.2d 491, 497 (W. Va. 2001) ("In the context of medical
malpractice actions, courts usually place extreme limits upon a health care provider's use of the
defense of comparative negligence" because of the "disparity in medical knowledge between the
patient and the physician" and because of the "patient's justifiable reliance on the [physician's]
recommendations and care.") (citing in part Madelynn R. Orr, Defense of Patient's Contributionto
Fault in Medical MalpracticeActions, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 665, 677 (1992)).
173. See McCrystal v. Trumbull Mem'l Hosp., 684 N.E.2d 721, 725-26 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that a nurse who negligently told a pregnant patient who called the office not to go to
the hospital for bleeding could not claim comparative fault of patient for listening to nurse's
advice and not going to the hospital anyway).
174. See KBF Assocs. v. Saul Ewing Remick & Saul, 35 Pa. D. & C. 4th 1 (1998) (holding that
in a legal malpractice case, the general partner of the firm issuing bonds was not contributorily
negligent for failing to check the work conducted by the retained law firm).
175. Brown, 595 N.W.2d at 368 ("[Tlhe very patient-doctor relation assumes trust and
confidence on the part of the patient .... ).
176. See id. at 362 (noting three potential aspects of plaintiffs duty, and accepting such a
duty "to tell the truth and give complete and accurate information about personal, family and
medical histories to a doctor to the extent possible in response to the doctor's requests for
information when the requested information is material to the doctor's [prescribed duty]"); see
also Pontiac Sch. Dist. v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, 563 N.W.2d 693, 703 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997) (allowing a law firm that did a poor job of drafting a school funding initiative to claim
comparative fault of school client for failing to raise problems with ballot language because no
special knowledge or expertise was required to identify problem); cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. LeValley, 786 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a diving company that
failed to supervise and instruct scuba divers adequately could claim comparative fault of woman
who concealed the fact that she suffered from asthma).
177. See Ponirakis v. Choi, 546 S.E.2d 707, 711 (Va. 2001) (finding that the plaintiff patient
was not contributorily negligent in failing to disclose prior episodes of blood and protein in his
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not have to advise the plaintiff on matters for which no special
training is required. 178 And a professional is not responsible for a
plaintiffs failure to follow professional recommendations, unless the
patient does not appreciate the importance of a failure to follow that

advice. 179
Professionals are not only expected to make good choices for
their patients and clients, but they are also required to provide
accurate information. In many cases, professionals have been barred
from asserting that the plaintiff was guilty of comparative negligence
for failing to discover information that the professional should have

provided. 180
Limits on comparative-fault defenses in cases involving
information asymmetries are not confined to professional malpractice
cases. For example, a seller who misled home buyers into thinking
that previous fire damage had been properly repaired could not allege
the comparative fault of the home buyers for failing to hire an
81
independent inspector to open the walls.1

urine when asked if he suffered from any "serious diseases," because a reasonable person would
not have understood such a condition to be a "serious" disease).
178. See Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1998) (holding that defendant doctor
had no duty to warn epileptic patient not to drive).
179. Lyons v. Walker Reg'l Med. Ctr., 791 So. 2d 937, 944-45 (Ala. 2000) (refusing
contributory-negligence defense for defendant medical center for plaintiffs uninformed refusal of
medical treatment); Smith v. Washington, 734 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Ind. 2000) (holding that
plaintiffs failure to take medication which may have contributed to the loss of an eye was not
comparative fault); Walter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 748 A.2d 961, 972 (Me. 2000) (holding that
plaintiffs failure to get prompt blood test was not comparative fault because plaintiff could not
be expected to know why blood test was important).
180. Aden v. Fortsh, 776 A.2d 792, 802-03 (N.J. 2001) (denying comparative fault to
insurance broker who negligently sold plaintiffs an insurance policy far below the value of their
property's value for plaintiffs failure to read the policy or detect the broker's negligence); In re
Med. Review Panel, 657 So. 2d 713, 723 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a doctor in a medical
malpractice wrongful conception case who did not perform the planned tubal ligation during a
Cesarian section without informing the patient could not claim that the patient had a duty to
ascertain whether tubal ligation had been performed).
181. See Greycas v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1566 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the lender's
attorney could trust borrower's attorney's representation that he had performed a lien search
and that there were no liens on the property); Dupree v. City of New Orleans, 765 So. 2d 1002,
1015-16 (La. 2000) (holding that when the city failed to mark deep water on a road, there was no
comparative fault when plaintiff drove through what she thought was a puddle); Strom v. Logan,
18 P.3d 1024, 1029 (Mont. 2001) (denying comparative-fault defense to seller, who misled home
buyers into thinking that fire damage had been properly repaired, against owners for their
failure to hire an independent inspector to open the walls). Situations in which the parties are in
a differential position from which to collect information such as prior complaints, and injuries
may also spawn limits on comparative-fault defenses. Cf. Anthony Kronman, Mistake,
Disclosure,Information and the Law of Contracts,7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-13, 32-34 (1978) (noting
both the distinction and symmetry between unilateral mistake and duties to disclose information
in contract law).
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c. Control Differentials
Structural safety cases also limit comparative-fault defenses
initiated by defendants who have a greater ability to control systemic
safety decisions. For example, in Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, the plaintiff,
an employee at the Vulcan foundry, worked with a shot blast machine
manufactured and installed by the defendant.1 8 2 The plaintiff was
injured "when his hand got caught in the chain and sprocket drive of
the conveyor system of the machine." 18 3 The plaintiff sued the
defendant on theories of strict liability and negligence, and the jury
agreed that the shot blast machine was defective in a way that had
caused plaintiffs injury.' 8 4 The jury found that Jet Blast was
negligent, but that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
as well.18 5 Nevertheless, the district court awarded the plaintiff the
full $150,000 of damages. 8 6 On review, the appellate court certified
the following question to the Louisiana Supreme Court: "Does the
Louisiana Civil Code permit the defense known as contributory
negligence to be advanced to defeat or mitigate a claim of strict
liability based upon a defective product... ?,,187
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that "the principle of
comparative fault may be applied in some products cases."'8 8 However,
it also held that the principle of contributory or comparative fault
could not be applied in this case, which involved "an industrial
accident resulting in injury [ ] due to defective machinery and the
employee's ordinary contributory negligence."'1 9 To determine whether
to permit a comparative-fault defense to diminish the plaintiffs
recovery, the court focused on three factors: incentives to plaintiffs to
engage in safer conduct, incentives to defendants to create safer
products, and distribution of the burden of accidental injuries as a cost
of production. 190 The court held that "[t]he recovery of a plaintiff who
has been injured by a defective product should not be reduced [ ] in
those types of cases in which it does not serve realistically to promote
182. 462 So. 2d 166, 167 (La. 1985). Although parts of this products-liability decision were
superseded by statute, the court's holding with respect to comparative fault has been followed
even after that statute was enacted. See generally Dumas v. State ex rel. Dep't of Culture,
Recreation & Tourism, 828 So. 2d 530, 532-33 (La. 2002).
183. Bell, 462 So. 2d at 167.
184. Id.

185. Id.
186. Id. at 167-68.
187. Id. at 168.

188. Id. at 167.
189. Id. at 173.
190. Id. at 171.

2003]

COMPARATIVE FAULT TO THE LIMITS

1013

careful product use or where it drastically reduces the manufacturer's
incentive to make a safer product." 19 1 Since the court believed that
allowing the comparative-fault defense to diminish plaintiffs recovery
in this case "would not serve to provide any greater incentive to an
employee to guard against momentary neglect or inattention," would
reduce "economic incentive for product quality control," and would
force "the individual to underwrite the loss himself," the court chose
not to allow reduced recovery based on the comparative-fault

finding. 192
The Louisiana Supreme Court's focus on "realistically"
evaluating whether comparative-fault defenses will promote worker
safety represents a broader view that in some circumstances
comparative-fault defenses may undermine safety when large
differentials of power and control exist between parties such as
93
product designers and product users or employers and employees.1
When the plaintiff is unable to control overall structural factors, and
the defendant is able to exercise that control, efforts to heighten
plaintiff care through comparative-fault defenses may actually be
counterproductive-by undermining the more important incentives for
defendant care.1 94 When defendants have greater control over safety,
allocating the safety function entirely to them may be expected to
yield safer environments and promote efficiency. 195
This outlook mirrors concerns found in regulatory safety
systems such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Under that

191. Id. at 171-72.
192. Id. at 172.
193. See EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 8.2, at 192 ("Oftentimes the asymmetrical positions of the
parties suggest a differential capacity to avoid risk .... "); Schwartz, supra note 86, at 720-21
(suggesting that in employment and products cases the defendant has even greater control over
the plaintiffs unreasonable conduct than does the plaintiff himself).
194. In some cases "employers could institute system-wide precautions to protect workers
against momentary fatigue or neglect that could prove fatal." EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 8.2, at
193; cf. Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1566, 1566 (7th Cir. 1987) (expressing concern about a
shift from a superior form of accident avoidance to an inferior form of accident avoidance).
195. The industrial accident rate declined sharply in the years after the adoption of workers'
compensation even though "the advent of workers' compensation should have occasioned a major
outbreak of [employee] carelessness." Schwartz, supra note 86, at 719. Indeed, Professor
Schwartz is not suggesting a causal relationship, but rather cautions against the assumption of a
causal relationship between plaintiff recoveries and plaintiff care. Id. at 698-99. Workplace
accident rates have continued to decline in recent years. Alan B. Krueger, Fewer Workplace
Injuries and Illness Are Adding up to Economic Strength, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2000, at C2
(stating that on-the-job injuries have been cut by twenty-five percent over an eight-year time
period). And yet, no-fault insurance seems to be correlated with an increase in the number of
accidents. Schwartz, supra note 86, at 698. Perhaps this difference is attributable to defendants'
greater ability to control workplace factors, and plaintiffs' greater certainty of recovering under a
no-fault insurance system than under a tort system even without a comparative-fault defense.
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act, OSHA has promulgated a "Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy," which
reflects a general preference for engineering controls before resorting
to individualized employee safety measures.' 96 With respect to
environmental contaminants in the workplace, for example, a
hierarchy-of-controls policy requires an employer to reduce airborne
pollutants as far as feasible through structural methods, such as use
of fewer toxic materials or better ventilation, before resorting to more
individualized compliance-based safeguards such as asking employees
to wear respirators. 97 The primary rationale for preferring
engineering controls to individual worker controls is that engineering
controls make protection "automatic," while more individualized
controls "are dependant on use and constant attention and are subject
to human error."' 9 8 To the extent that defendants can shape an
environment to make safety automatic for a large number of people,
through engineering controls or work-practice controls,' 99 greater
incentives for defendants to take those sorts of precautions may
20 0
promote both deterrence and accountability.
Many courts have limited comparative-fault defenses in certain
products liability cases in which the defendant controls the process of
design and production. 20 ' Similarly, courts may limit comparative196. Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 1999).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1269.
199. See Am. Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that
engineering controls for reducing workers' exposure to blood-borne contaminants like HIV and
HBV include requirements about the location of sinks, while work-practice controls include
specific standards of care for handling sharp objects such as needles); see also Easton v. Chevron
Indus., Inc., 602 So. 2d 1032, 1039 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a man crushed while trying
to escape from crane that had overturned could not be charged with fault because he was doing
exactly what his supervisor told him to do).
200. Dobbs, supra note 67, at 962 (asserting that principles of accountability support full
recovery by a plaintiff when the defendant knows or should know of the "plaintiffs limited ability
to achieve safety for himself').
201. Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 171-72 (La. 1985) (holding that the "recovery of
a plaintiff ...

should not be reduced ...

in those types of cases in which it does not serve

realistically to promote careful product use or where it drastically reduces the manufacturer's
incentive to make a safer product"); D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424, 426, 437-39
(Fla. 2001) (denying defendant charged with design-defect defense of plaintiff comparative fault
for driving while under the influence); Norton Co. v. Fergestrom, No. 35719, 2001 WL 1628302,
at *5 (Nev. Nov. 9 2001) ("[Clontributory negligence is not a defense in a products liability
action."); Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 682 A.2d 724, 735 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(ordering retrial on the issue of comparative fault because the plaintiff could only be charged
with comparative fault if he was specifically aware of product risk); Hernandez v. Barbo Mach.
Co., 957 P.2d 147, 154 (Ore. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a plaintiff is not guilty of comparative
fault when his injury resulted "in whole or in part, form an 'unobservant, inattentive, ignorant,
or awkward' failure to discover or guard against alleged defects in the product"). But see Smith v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 14 P.3d 990, 994-96 (Alaska 2000) (holding that tort reform statute made
plaintiffs negligence a defense to a products liability action). See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE
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fault claims against employers who can take systemic precautions to
20 2
avoid injuries.
Courts may also limit comparative-fault defenses in other
contexts in which defendants' relatively greater control suggests that
structural safety precautions would be beneficial. 203 For example,
mental and penal institutions may be required to structure their
environments and care around foreseeable hazards to patients and
prisoners. 20 4 Thus, a mental institution that fails to protect a
depressed patient from committing suicide might be barred from
invoking the patient's negligence as a defense. 20 5 Other defendants

LAW: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17(d) (1997) (stating that the majority position is to permit plaintiffs
failure to use reasonable care to be considered by the jury but cautioning that sufficient evidence
of plaintiff fault must be introduced and that in general "a plaintiff has no reason to expect that
a new product contains a defect and would have little reason to be on guard to discover it" and
that momentary inattention in a workplace setting may not be negligent).
202. See Lathan Roof Am., Inc. v. Hairston, 828 So. 2d 262, 267-68 (Ala. 2002) (holding that
comparative negligence is not an available defense under the state's Employer's Liability Act);
Nickels v. Napolilli, 29 P.3d 242, 248-49 (Alaska 2001) (forbidding farmer charged with
negligence toward worker who worked for benefits rather than cash from bringing comparativefault claim against worker when the farmer had no worker's compensation insurance); Fuches v.
S.E.S. Co., 459 N.W.2d 642, 643, 644 (Iowa 1990) (rejecting employer claim that worker who
assembled the scaffold from incompatible frames and boards could have recovery reduced as a
result of his failure to inspect scaffold to see that it was secure); Gepner v. Fujicolor Processing,
Inc., 637 N.W.2d 681, 686 (N.D. 2001) (barring an uninsured employer from raising contributorynegligence defense in civil action concerning plaintiffs work injury); Cremeans v. Willmar
Henderson Mfg. Co., 566 N.E.2d 1203, 1209 (Ohio 1991) (finding defense of comparative fault
inapplicable in suit against employer and manufacturer for injury sustained by front-end load
operator in a fertilizer avalanche).
203. Magna Trust Co. v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 728 N.E.2d 797, 809 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (holding
comparative-fault defense to be an invalid claim under the Safety Appliances Act).
204. See DOBBS, supra note 7, § 200, at 501; Myers v. County of Lake, 30 F.3d 847, 852 (7th
Cir. 1994); cf. Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that transsexual
prisoner "is entitled to be protected by assignment to protective custody or otherwise, from
harassment by prisoners who wish to use him as a sexual plaything, provided that the danger is
both acute and known to the authorities").
205. Sandborg v. Blue Earth County, 615 N.W.2d 61, 62 (Minn. 2000) (holding that when
plaintiff does not have the capacity to care for himself the jailer must use reasonable care to
prevent his suicide); Tomfour v. Mayo Found., 450 N.W.2d 121, 121 (Minn. 1990) (finding that a
hospital caring for man with suicidal tendencies could not take advantage of comparative-fault
defense against patient who intentionally killed himself); Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159, 164
(N.J. 1988) (noting that defendant had a duty to prevent patient's foreseeable self-inflicted harm,
thus obviating the defense of contributory negligence); Rodebush v. Okla. Nursing Homes, Ltd.,
867 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Okla. 1993) (finding that a nurse who slapped combative patient could not
maintain comparative-fault claim); Jankee v. Clark County, 612 N.W.2d 287, 325 (Wis. 2000)
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (noting, in a case involving an involuntarily institutionalized
patient, that "improper or inappropriate imposition of the defense of contributory negligence can
lead to the dilution or diminution of a duty of care"); Sarah Light, Rejecting the Logic of
Confinement: Care Relationshipsand the Mentally Disabled Under Tort Law, 109 YALE L.J. 381,
400-09 (1999). But see Jankee, 612 N.W.2d at 324 (holding that a mental health patient was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law for injuries during escape attempt where
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charged with safely structuring physical environments face similar
20 6
bans.
In the area of food and drug safety, the responsibility for
furnishing a safe product sometimes is delegated entirely to the
defendant. For instance, a pharmacist who negligently dispensed the
wrong medication could not assert the defense that the patient should
have known the name of the drug prescribed 20 7 or should have known
how it looked when the drug had been previously prescribed for the
plaintiff but not taken. 208 At times, providers of alcohol may also be
20 9
treated as having a categorical advantage in ensuring safety.
d. Combinations
A number of cases involve a combination of information,
experience, and control differentials. In child labor cases, for example,
comparative-fault defenses are often barred when the plaintiff has a
2 10
limited capacity to protect herself both as a child and as a worker.
The same kind of limits may apply to an employee trainee, 211 an
employee who was harmed by a defendant's statutory violation, 212 or a
hospitalization stemmed from patient's "failure to comply with a medication program that
controlled his mental disability").
206. See Rountree v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operation Auth., 261 A.D.2d 324,
326-28 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that a bus driver who stopped suddenly could not claim
comparative fault of passenger who had been drinking and did not grip the handrail tightly); cf.
Kings Markets, Inc. v. Yeatts, 307 S.E.2d 249, 254 (Va. 1983) (holding that in a contributorynegligence jurisdiction, a defendant who had inadequately salted his sidewalk could not
maintain a defense of comparative fault for plaintiffs step onto an icy patch of ground).
207. Walter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 748 A.2d 961, 969-72 (Me. 2000) (holding that a
pharmacy that misfilled a patient's chemotherapy prescription could not claim her comparative
fault for failing to notice that the name of the prescription was not the same as the name of the
drug her doctor had mentioned, failing to notify her doctor promptly of the medication's ill effects
or of delay in receiving a blood test).
208. Olson v. Walgreen Co., No. CX-92-528, 1992 WL 322054, at *3-4 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov.
10, 1992) (holding that a pharmacist who filled the wrong prescription could not argue
comparative fault of patient who should have known how the medication looked because the
patient should have but did not take medication on a prior occasion).
209. Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc., 643 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Iowa 2002) (denying comparative fault
as a defense to a dramshop action).
210. See Strain v. Christians, 483 N.W.2d 783, 787-89 (S.D. 1992) (holding that defendant
farmer who violated child labor statute could not claim contributory negligence of child for
operating a tractor which flipped over); D.L. v. Huebner, 329 N.W.2d 890, 919 (Wis. 1983)
(denying contributory negligence as a defense to liability to defendant who employed minor
injured plaintiff in contravention of state child labor law).
211. Easton v. Chevron Indus., Inc., 602 So. 2d 1032, 1039 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
212. Magna Trust Co. v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 728 N.E.2d 797, 809 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000) (barring a
comparative-fault claim as a defense to Safety Appliances Act). But see Nigreville v. Fed. Rural
Elec. Ins. Co., 642 So. 2d 216, 220-21 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (permitting contributory negligence in
assessing the amount of damages).
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child who committed suicide while institutionalized. 2 13 Similarly,
when a phone company locates its physical equipment in a way that
enables children to climb over a fence and jump into a swimming pool,
both systemic safety considerations and child inexperience may play a
2 14
role in the resulting limitation.
3.

Role Definition

Even when defendants are not better situated than plaintiffs to
exercise care for the plaintiffs safety, courts may limit comparativefault defenses so that defendants cannot litigate away contractual or
social obligations to care for a negligent plaintiff.2 15 The key difference
between this category and the structural safety category is that
although the defendant in this category may be the better care
provider at a particular time, in a broader frame the defendant is not
necessarily better able to safeguard the plaintiffs interests than is the
plaintiff herself. Rather, in this category, limits are placed on
defendants' (often professional helpers') use of comparative-fault
defenses to set baseline levels of care owed to even negligent plaintiffs.
For example, in DeMoss v. Hamilton, a thirty-two-year-old man
went to a hospital emergency room with chest pains. 216 The emergency
room doctor conducted a number of tests and concluded that the
problem was recurrent bronchitis. 21 7 The man was sent home with a
prescription for antibiotics and instructions to check with the hospital
a few days later if his condition did not improve. 2 18 By the next
21 9
morning, he had died of a heart attack in his home.
The decedent's widow brought a medical malpractice action
against the emergency room physician for failure to diagnose properly
the plaintiffs heart condition, failure to conduct further medical tests
and treatment, and failure to obtain an adequate medical history

213. Myers v. County of Lake, 30 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that teenager's
intentional suicide was no basis for comparative-fault defense to the juvenile center's failure to
screen for suicidal tendencies).
214. See Mt. Zion State Bank & Trust v. Consol. Communications, 641 N.E.2d 1228, 1235-37
(Ill. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a telephone company charged with negligently placing a
pedestal near fence that allowed a child to climb into the pool area could not claim plaintiff
fault), reu'd, 660 N.E.2d 863 (1995) (foreclosing imposition of liability because pool was open and
obvious danger that company could reasonably expect a six-year-old boy to avoid).
215. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 200, at 500 ("[W]hat counts as contributory negligence is
determined largely by the scope of the defendant's duty.").
216. 644 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2002).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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(which included a prior heart attack). 220 In defense of his conduct, the
physician asserted, among other defenses, the decedent's comparative
fault. 221 Specifically, the doctor argued that after the decedent's last
heart attack his previous physician had counseled him to "stop
smoking and pursue an aggressive exercise regimen to lower his
had not taken
weight and cholesterol." 222 The decedent, however,
223
disease.
heart
of
risk
his
these measures to reduce
After carefully examining the parties' arguments with respect
to the comparative-fault defense, the Iowa Supreme Court subjected
the defense to a tight relevance inquiry. The court noted that the
doctor's alleged negligence concerned misdiagnosis and treatment, and
then determined that the decedent's alleged fault was "simply
irrelevant to the question of medical negligence underlying [the] cause
of action." 224 Because the decedent's negligence did not cause the
defendant's negligence, the court held that the comparative-fault
defense was inappropriate. 225 According to the court, whether the
decedent's "state of health resulted from poor lifestyle choices or bad
genes," it would "make no difference." 226 The court ultimately agreed
with the plaintiff that, "even a patient who suffers227a self-inflicted
injury is entitled to non-negligent medical treatment."
Judicial limits on comparative-fault defenses in cases such as
DeMoss both define the defendant's role and the negligent plaintiffs
entitlement. When a court prevents doctors from asserting plaintiffs'
smoking or other poor health choices as a defense to alleged
malpractice, the court defines doctors' obligation of care as an
obligation to take reasonable care for all patients suffering from injury
or disease, not merely for the patients suffering from diseases not
caused by patient negligence. By excluding the defense of plaintiffs
negligence, the court actively constructs the role of a doctor-to use
reasonable care for a patient even when that patient has not used
reasonable care for himself, which is, of course, unlike other
defendants' usual obligation. 228 Through this definition of defendants'

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 307.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 305.
228. See Harding v. Deiss, 3 P.3d 1286, 1289 (Mont. 2000) (rejecting comparative-fault claim
brought by a doctor against a girl who triggered her asthma attack by horseback riding on the
ground that the defense would lead to the "absurd result" that "the treating physician would not
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obligation, the court also defines patients' entitlement to medical
care-an entitlement to reasonable care from others that exists even
when the plaintiff himself behaves unreasonably to create the medical
229
problem.
These decisions do not necessarily assign liability based on
which party is better able to care for the plaintiffs physical well-being.
In many cases, the patient could have cared for his health as well as
or better than the doctor could have. For example, a patient's decision
not to smoke might be as important in preventing an early cancer
death as a doctor's prompt detection and treatment of the cancer.
To some extent, defining doctors' obligation to include care for
negligent as well as nonnegligent patients reflects principles of both
contract and tort law. Because doctors charge their patients the same
fee for treatment regardless of the cause of the patients' injury or
illness, doctors may be said to owe the same obligation to all patients.
Moreover, because the doctor agrees to care for the patient after he
has suffered the negligent injury or illness, the doctor's obligation to
care for the negligent plaintiff is akin to an implicit indemnity
contract. In an indemnity contract, the defendant has contracted to
230
shoulder the risk when the other party is negligent.
The care that even negligent patients are entitled to expect
from doctors may stem from the social contract as well as an
individual contract. Even if a doctor wanted to charge lower rates and
to take less care for patients who had developed diseases through
negligence, professional norms and ethics would likely prevent such a
practice.
Many cases that preclude comparative-fault defenses because
the defendant had a duty to care for a negligent plaintiff involve
defendants who might be called professional helpers or rescuers.
Moreover, many of these cases (though not all) outline the entitlement
of a negligent person to receive subsequent aid. As illustrated, many
courts do not allow doctors to bring comparative-fault claims against
patients whose negligence led to their need for treatment. 231 Similarly,
be liable for negligent treatment" when "the patient was responsible for events that led to her
hospitalization").
229. See Rowe v. Sisters of the Pallotine Missionary Soc'y, 560 S.E.2d 491, 497 (W. Va. 2001)
("Those patients who may have negligently injured themselves are nevertheless entitled to
subsequent non-negligent medical treatment .. ") (quoting Fritts v. McKinne, 934 P.2d 371,
374 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996)).
230. My thanks to Dan Dobbs for this thoughtful analogy.
231. See, e.g., King v. Clark, 709 N.E.2d 1043, 1049 (Ind.Ct. App. 1999) (Robb, J., dissenting)
(arguing that plaintiffs initial delay in seeking treatment for breast lump should not be
considered comparative negligence in her action against a doctor for doctor's subsequent failure
to diagnose her breast cancer); DeMoss, 644 N.W.2d at 306-07; Harding,3 P.3d at 1289; Rowe,
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comparative-fault claims may be limited when negligent plaintiffs
234
233
turn for assistance to tow truck drivers, 232 attorneys, or insurers.
Police officers' duty to use reasonable care for even guilty
criminals reflects similar themes. Courts have prevented police
officers from raising comparative-fault defenses to support their use of
excessive force. 23 5 Consequently, police officers have obligations of
reasonable care for even negligent (and intentional) tortfeasor
plaintiffs. 236 Courts have bound private security officers to similar
23 7
standards.

560 S.E.2d at 497; cf. Ponirakis v. Choi, 546 S.E.2d 707, 711 (Va. 2001) (reaching a similar ruling
with respect to contributory negligence); DAVID M. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 24.1, at
564 (3d ed. 1993) (stating that contributory-negligence defense is inapplicable "where a patient's
conduct provides the occasion for care or treatment that, later, is the subject of a malpractice
claim, or where the patient's conduct contributes to an illness or condition for which the patient
seeks the care or treatment on which a subsequent medical malpractice [claim] is based").
232. Dyer v. Super. Ct. of L.A., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 89 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a driver
who negligently maintained car and occasioned accident had no duty to maintain car with
respect to a tow truck driver injured while giving aid).
233. Smith v. Mehaffy, 30 P.3d 727, 731 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that attorney who
failed to advise client that first-class notice client had sent before initiating legal action would
not be sufficient to establish legal claim could not claim comparative fault of client for mistake
made prior to hiring attorney).
234. William Powers, Jr., What a ComparativeBad Faith Defense Tells Us About Bad Faith
Insurance Litigation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1571, 1575-76 (1994) (stating that "[a] plaintiffs negligence
in causing the insurance-triggering event is similar to a plaintiffs conduct that helped cause an
underlying condition in a medical malpractice case. We would not let the doctor claim that the
patient negligently caused heart disease or an automobile accident that required medical
treatment" and arguing that comparative-fault defenses should not be permitted in the bad faith
context either).
235. Mikel v. City of Rochester, 695 N.Y.S.2d 462, 463 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that a police
officer who negligently executed search warrant could not claim comparative fault of an injured
plaintiff who was present in an apartment that was known to be used for the sale of drugs); see
also Fire Ins. Exch. v. Barrey, 694 P.2d 191, 194 (Ariz. 1994) (suggesting that in a case involving
the use of excessive force in self-defense, action might not sound in intentional tort but might in
negligence).
236. City of Hobbs v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 576, 579 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that
"comparative fault doctrine was not available for the § 1983 claim"); Jackson v. Hoffman, No. 914054-RDR, 1994 WL 114007, at *1 (D. Kan. 1994) (noting that "comparative negligence is not
applied in § 1983"); LaBauve v. State, 618 So. 2d 1187, 1196 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (Woodard, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that comparative fault should not apply in this negligence suit "for excessive
use of force because the actions and conduct of the plaintiff/arrestee are considered in the initial
determination of whether the force was reasonable under the circumstances"); Baldwin v. City of
Omaha, 607 N.W.2d 841, 844, 851 (Neb. 2000) (psychotic football player could be charged with
comparative fault for failure to take medication but could not be charged with comparative fault
for failing to heed police warnings).
237. Heiner v. Kmart Corp., 84 Cal. App. 4th 335, 339, 348 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a
store security guard who used excessive force could not claim comparative fault of plaintiff who
reached over the counter to find his receipt); cf. Yasuna v. Big V Supermarkets, Inc., 725
N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (App. Div. 2001) (permitting store security guard who tripped shoplifter while
shoplifter was attempting to flee to allege shoplifter's comparative fault).

2003]

COMPARATIVE FAULT TO THE LIMITS
4.

1021

The Values of Process

When litigating plaintiff comparative-fault defenses itself
creates problems, courts may also limit jury consideration of
comparative-fault questions. Courts have limited plaintiff-fault
defenses in cases that raise three distinct process-related concerns:
comparative-fault defenses might traumatize participants, they might
create expensive or unmanageable litigation issues, or they might
provide a statement of relative fault when such relative statements
are morally problematic.
a. Litigants' Welfare
A number of cases have limited comparative-fault defenses
when such defenses might be expected to cause psychological harm to
litigants. For example, even though young adults are considered
capable of making some reasoned choices, many courts have not
permitted findings of child comparative negligence in cases involving
sexual assault, whether the plaintiffs claim was filed against the
rapist or against a third party. 238 While these limitations are based on
a number of substantive grounds, they stem in part from concerns
239
that a focus on the victim's fault may further traumatize the victim.
This concern may be particularly acute in cases in which children
testify. Along with concerns that child testimony might be
traumatic, 240 telling a child of his moral blameworthiness in the face of
241
the child's victimization and suffering may revictimize him.

238. Hutchison v. Luddy, 763 A.2d 826, 846-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding that a church
that was negligent in hiring, supervising, and retaining a sexually abusive priest could not claim
comparative fault of boy for continuing to see priest despite ongoing abuse); DeBose v. Bear
Valley Church of Christ, 890 P.2d 214, 231 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting church claim that boy
who had been sexually abused could be expected to report instances of abuse), rev'd on other
grounds, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1997); Landreneau v. Fruge, 676 So. 2d 701, 707 (La. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that teacher and bus driver could not claim that child was at fault for
molestation); see also Dunlea v. Dappen, 924 P.2d 196, 200 (Haw. 1996) (denying comparativefault defense against daughter by father in incest case). But see Beul v. ASSE Int'l, Inc., 233 F.3d
441, 450-51 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding assignment of forty-one percent of fault to teenage foreign
exchange student from Germany who was repeatedly raped by the father of her host family).
239. See DeBose, 890 P.2d at 231 (taking care to reverse a plaintiff fault determination of
just four percent).
240. See L. Christine Brannon, The Trauma of Testifying in Court for Child Victims of
Sexual Assault v. the Accused's Right to Confrontation,18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 439 (1994).
241. See Mary P. Koss et al., A Cognitive Mediational Model of Rape Recovery: Preliminary
Specification and Testing in Cross-SectionalData,J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH., Aug. 2002,
at 926-41; Mary P. Koss & Aurelio J. Figueredo, A Cognitive Mediational Model of Rape
Recovery: Constructive Replication and Validation of a Cross-Sectional Model in Longitudinal
Data (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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b. Administrative Ease
Courts also limit comparative-fault defenses when the defense
would be too difficult or costly to litigate. For example, the traditional
doctrine that the defendant takes the plaintiff as she finds him may
stem in part from the court's desire not to litigate collateral questions.
Litigating the plaintiffs fault for a prior injury in the plaintiffs
current case against a defendant could create a trial within a trial,
something that courts often try to prevent. 242 Such limits are created
even though the plaintiffs fault may have been a cause of her harm.
Such cases are not cases in which the plaintiff has not been negligent,
but rather, they are entitlement cases (although the entitlement may
be designed simply to benefit the legal system's process interest in
24 3
avoiding litigation of stale issues).
c. Absolute Judgments
Finally, courts may limit comparative-fault defenses when they
believe that the tort language of relative fault (twenty-five to seventyfive percent, fifty-two to forty-eight percent, and so forth) will
undermine rights that are thought to be absolute or in need of a clear
delegation of responsibility. 244 For example, courts may bar
intentional tortfeasors from invoking the comparative fault of their
victims because they affirmatively desire the all-or-nothing fault
statements of the traditional rules-that intentional tortfeasors are
solely responsible for the harms they cause. 2 45 The right not to be
murdered or battered (even if the plaintiff is foolish or careless) can be
conveyed more forcefully by the moral absolutes of all-or-nothing

242. Cf. McCabe v. R.A. Manning Constr. Co., 674 P.2d 699, 712 (Wyo. 1983) (upholding
lower court's exclusion of testimony in contract action on the basis that the testimony would
create a "trial within a trial").
243. See Matsumoto v. Kaku, 484 P.2d 147, 150 (Haw. 1971) ("[W]here the preexisting back
ailment was not the result of any transaction involving other persons, we hold that such
preexisting condition should be treated no differently than from a condition brought about by
disease.').
244. See Gary T. Schwartz, Feminist Approaches to Tort Law, THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L.,

Jan. 2001, at 175 (arguing that no-duty rules allow the law to free ride on popular morality and
affect norms).
245. See Dunlea v. Dappen, 924 P.2d 196, 200 n.6 (Haw. 1996) (referring to a comparativefault defense to "incestuous rape of a minor" "frivolous," "repugnant," and sanctionable); cf.
Hutchison v. Luddy, 763 A.2d 826, 848 (Pa. 2001) (denying comparative-fault defense brought by
church against child sexual abuse victim of priest and explaining that allowing such a defense
"would be the equivalent of characterizing the sexual molestation of children as a negligent act
caused by being in the wrong place at the wrong time instead of characterizing it as an
intentional act resulting from the repugnant conduct of the molester").
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judgments than by partial tort verdicts, even when those verdicts
246
would result in similar amounts of damage payments.
Similarly, in a number of traffic accident cases, courts have
refused to permit defendants who run red lights to claim that
plaintiffs should have stopped on green. A finding that the defendant
was only eighty percent at fault for failing to stop on red and that the
plaintiff was twenty percent at fault for proceeding on green could
undermine the normative clarity of the categorical rule that cars
should obey traffic signals. 247 To the extent that the percentage fault
comparisons blur norms regarding entitlements, the law might not
only lose its free ride on morality, but also alter that morality in ways
248
that are not socially desirable.
5.

Fundamental Values

When the plaintiff has a constitutional or otherwise
fundamental entitlement to engage in a particular activity, courts
often hesitate to let juries decide on a case-by-case basis whether the
exercise of that entitlement is reasonable. 249 This hesitancy may
reflect the belief that plaintiffs exercise of her entitlement is
necessarily reasonable once normative values are factored into the
risk-utility equation. Courts may also believe that even though the
plaintiffs exercise of her entitlement poses an unreasonable risk, they
should nevertheless be wary of permitting juries to burden the
246. See William McNichols, Should Comparative Responsibility Ever Apply to Intentional
Torts?, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 641, 678-85 (1984) (discussing the policy reasons for disfavoring partial
tort verdicts in intentional tort cases).
247. See Olson v. Parchen, 816 P.2d 423, 426-27 (Mont. 1991) (holding that a driver who
failed to yield as required could not allege comparative fault of plaintiff for failure to watch and
see if defendant was going to comply with right-of-way); Springer v. Bohling, 643 N.W.2d 386,
392-94 (Neb. 2002) (holding that a driver who failed to yield right-of-way and then hit a cyclist
could not raise contributory-negligence defense based on cyclist's failure to keep a proper
lookout); Weitzenkamp v. Morgan, No. A-99-281, 2000 WL 781374, at *4-6 (Neb. Ct. App. June
20, 2000) (holding that a driver who ran a stop sign and killed plaintiff could not claim plaintiffs
fault for failing to keep a lookout and stop for defendant who disregarded the traffic signal);
Dutton v. Jensen, No. 19010-9-I1, 1997 WL 52941, at *2-3 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1997) (denying
comparative-fault claim to a driver who turned without waiting for oncoming traffic against
plaintiff for failing to realize that defendant was not going to yield, because plaintiff had a right
to assume that the disfavored driver would yield the right-of-way).
248. For example, permitting comparative fault as a defense to the intentional tort of battery
sanctions physical violence as an appropriate response to offensive speech. See, e.g., Bonpua v.
Fagan, 602 A.2d 287, 289 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (finding that defendant convicted of
aggravated assault sufficiently alleged comparative fault of plaintiff who called him a "faggot" in
front of his girlfriend).
249. Cf. Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine: Visions of a Restatement (Fourth)
of Torts, 50 UCLA L. REV. 585, 615 (2002) (providing five policy arguments for situations in
which tort liability should be denied, including "important and trumping social values").
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exercise of that entitlement. For example, in Lovelace Medical Center
v. Mendez, the plaintiff had tubal ligation surgery. 2 0 The physician
who performed the operation "found and ligated only one of
[plaintiffs] two fallopian tubes and then failed to inform her of the
unsuccessful outcome of the operation."25 1 When plaintiff used no birth
control after the operation, she conceived and bore a son. 252 In her
medical malpractice suit against the physician for the wrongful
conception, the doctor denied responsibility for child-rearing
expenses. 25 3 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the doctor was
2 54
responsible and based its opinion on the appellate court's analysis.
In that analysis, the appellate court addressed whether the plaintiff
was "required to mitigate damages by either having an abortion or
placing the child up for adoption." 255 While recognizing that "both of
these alternatives are available to and chosen by a certain number of
families each year," the court nevertheless held that neither course of
action "may properly be required [of the plaintiff] in order to mitigate
the financial consequences of the doctor's negligence." 25 6 As such, the
supreme court affirmed that "the trial shall not allow argument on
this issue, nor instruct the jury concerning the requirement of
mitigation," (which is often considered a form of comparative fault) as
2 57
a matter of law.
Thus even when abortion or adoption are the least financially
costly alternatives to an unwanted pregnancy, some courts have
determined that plaintiffs who refuse to take those options cannot be
labeled unreasonable or lose a part of their damage award based on
their decision. The concern is not necessarily to ensure that plaintiffs
who conceive unwanted children are compensated-as demonstrated
by the fact that many courts deny recovery for all wrongful conception
claims. Moreover, there is little reason to suspect that juries would be
biased against persons who did not want to abort children or to give
them up for adoption. But even if juries would often arrive at this
same conclusion, courts want to make the decision categorically. One
reason is that courts are concerned about limiting recovery based on

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
Alarid's
255.
256.
257.

805 P.2d 603, 604 (N.M. 1991).
Id. at 604-05.
Id. at 605.
See id. at 604-05.
Id. at 605 ("On the merits, we find ourselves in substantial agreement with Judge
opinion and accordingly reproduce all of Part II of that opinion in the appendix.").
Id. at 620.
Id. at 621.
Id.
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the plaintiffs exercise of a protected choice or a fundamental right. 258
Moreover, the lack of standards and consistency that would result
from jury determinations would be more troubling when the right
burdened is one that is constitutionally protected. In addition, a jury
finding that continuing an unwanted pregnancy is negligent makes a
normative statement that seems in tension with a government's stated
preference for life. 259 Thus, while a decision to have an abortion or give
a child up for adoption might minimize the plaintiffs child-rearing
damages in a wrongful conception case, courts have refused to allow
juries to say that a reasonable person should have made that decision,
because of the other important normative considerations beyond
260
damage minimization.
In some cases, courts do not permit the legal system to find
comparative fault when a legislature would be prohibited from ex ante
regulation of the plaintiffs conduct. For example, the legislature could
not constitutionally prohibit women from living in first-floor
apartments, and a court may be concerned about letting jurors reach
such a conclusion. 26 1 In most cases, the concern is about conditioning a
benefit (the plaintiffs lawsuit) on her willingness to forgo a legal
right. 262 Building protection for plaintiffs fundamental values into the
defendant's obligation may minimize the number of situations in

258. See Williams v. Bright, 632 N.Y.S.2d 760, 766 (Sup. Ct. 1995) ("If the Jehovah's Witness
rejection of blood transfusion in surgery is deemed by a jury to be 'unreasonable,' then a
judgment has been made as to the soundness of the religion ....
The making of such a decision
is clearly beyond the scope of what any agency of government may do.")
259. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (discussing the states' "profound
interest in potential life").
260. See, e.g., Lovelace Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d at 621 (holding "as a matter of law" that "neither
abortion nor adoption ... may properly be required in order to mitigate the financial
consequences of the doctor's negligence"); Johnson v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d
1370, 1377 (Ohio 1989) ("[I1n a 'wrongful pregnancy' action, the mother need not mitigate
damages by abortion or adoption since a tort victim has no duty to make unreasonable efforts to
diminish or avoid prospective damages .. "); see also Norman M. Block, Note, Wrongful Birth:
The Avoidance of Consequences Doctrine in Mitigation of Damages, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107,
1119-20 (1985) (arguing that in failure-to-abort cases the jury should determine what a
reasonably prudent person with the "religious, ethical and moral" beliefs of the plaintiff would
have done).
261. Jackson v. Post Props., Inc., 513 S.E.2d 259, 261-62 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing trial
court's summary judgment for defendant landlord against plaintiff first-floor resident on the
grounds that the issue of plaintiffs contributory negligence in her rape by virtue of moving into a
ground-floor apartment was not per se negligence and was therefore a question of fact for the
jury).
262. Cf. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001) (finding that
conditioning money for legal services on attorneys' willingness not to challenge validity of
welfare laws was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment).
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which plaintiffs are asked to trade fundamental values for protection
26 3
of legal interests.
There is a wide range of other cases in which courts recognize
that plaintiffs fundamental interests can outweigh the safety
purchase. Thus, even if tort law is thought to serve wealth
maximization goals with some modification for other norms, there are
norms that warrant disregarding cost-benefit calculations. 264 Not only
are courts unwilling to allow burdens on plaintiff choices to favor life
in wrongful conception cases, but they also limit comparative-fault
defenses when the plaintiff attempts to preserve another's life. 265 In
the context of reproductive interests, a plaintiffs desire to procreate
has also been protected. 266 And although the issue has not been
directly decided, courts might well forbid a defendant in a wrongful
death case to assert the plaintiffs comparative fault for magnifying
267
financial damages by refusing to unplug a ward's life support.
Courts have been particularly aggressive in protecting free
speech from tort burdens. 268 While most of these protections benefit

263. Martha Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1017 (2000) (arguing that recognizing tragic choices "leads us to ask
how the tragic situation might have been avoided by better social planning"); see also Schwartz,
supra note 86, at 715-16 (stating that people take unreasonable risks because they
misunderstand the probability or magnitude of risks or are accounting for other opposing values
and that in these cases contributory negligence is problematic because it may not promote
deterrence).
264. Richard Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on
Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1173-74 (2000) (stating that some conflicts "do not
yield to cost-benefit analysis however generously construed" and providing an example of
tradeoffs between equality and market value in the context of improved education for girls living
in Third World countries).
265. Oulette v. Carde, 612 A.2d 687, 689-90 (R.I. 1992) (holding that in a rescue situation, a
plaintiffs recovery will be reduced only by a showing of recklessness); see, e.g., Cords v.
Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Wis. 1977) (finding that a rescuer was absolved of his own fault
because the sight of another in danger prompts rescue even if obviously dangerous).
266. See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 48 (Supp. 2002) (stating that "it seems plausible to say that
a woman cannot be charged with fault for seeking to bear children, even if she knows that,
because of a physician's negligence, it is risky to do so"; discussing Lynch v. Scheininger, 744
A.2d 113, 130 (N.J. 2000), a case in which the court partially recognized this principle when it
wrote: "We would not characterize the Lynches' election to conceive a child as fault-based
because the decision to procreate is so fundamentally subjective, and no standard of objective
reasonableness adequately could inform a decision about whether the determination to assume
the risks of conception was a reasonable one"; and yet noting that Lynch partially undermined
its conclusion by holding that the decision to conceive might count as a failure to minimize
damages).
267. See Flenory v. Eagle's Nest Apartments, 22 P.3d 613, 614 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001)
(permitting wrongful death claim in a case in which a guardian refused to withdraw life support
but in which comparative fault and failure to mitigate do not appear to have been raised).
268. See, e.g., Profl Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 55-56
(1993) (shielding objectively reasonable efforts to use judicial processes from antitrust liability);
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defendants, plaintiffs enjoy such protections as well. For example,
filing a lawsuit that costs more money to litigate than the plaintiff can
possibly recover through the litigation may not constitute
269
unreasonable conduct for the purpose of mitigation of damages.
Furthermore, a plaintiff would likely be protected from comparative
fault for certain kinds of petitioning activity such as filing a police
270
report.
In addition, courts have limited comparative-fault defenses to
protect plaintiffs' equality interests. So a defendant could not assert
the plaintiffs comparative fault on the ground that she lived alone in
a first-floor apartment or rode the subway alone at night (at least not
because she was a woman who did such things). 271 Courts have also
limited comparative-fault defenses that would penalize individuals
27 2
based on physical disability.
Courts are divided on the question of whether a plaintiff must
use reasonable care when that care violates plaintiffs religious
scruples. However, some courts have limited plaintiff-fault defenses in
these circumstances. 273 For example, a New York court held that a
Jehovah's Witness plaintiff did not have a duty to mitigate damages
by receiving a blood transfusion, even though her decision coupled
with the defendant's negligence caused her to become bedridden and
wheelchair bound.2 7 4 A persuasive case has been made that exceptions
275
might also be made for certain cultural practices as well.
Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (holding that imposing tort damages on defendant
newspaper for publishing minor rape victim's name would violate the First Amendment); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (holding that "libel ... must be measured by
standards that satisfy the First Amendment").
269. O'Brien v. Isaacs, 116 N.W.2d 246, 267 (Wis. 1962).
270. DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 274 (4th ed. 2000)

(modifying the Brandon Teena case to create a hypothetical in which a plaintiff reports an attack
to police and in which the report creates a greater risk of harm to herself).
271. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Allen, 374 S.E.2d 761, 766 (Ga. 1988) (rejecting
argument that a woman raped in the transit authority parking lot was contributorily negligent
for riding the subway alone at night); Jackson v. Post Props., Inc., 513 S.E.2d 259, 262-63 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1999) (calling the comparative-fault argument "untenable" but nevertheless holding
that "a jury must determine whether [plaintiffs] move to a ground floor apartment was a failure
to exercise ordinary care for her own safety").
272. The take-the-plaintiff-as-you-find-her cases might be listed as cases in which the
plaintiff is not negligent because she had no reasonable alternative or can be viewed as
entitlement cases-a plaintiff has no obligation to stay home and out of the potential for traffic
accidents just because she has brittle bones, for example.
273. Williams v. Bright, 632 N.Y.S.2d 760, 761 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (questioning reasonableness
of a Jehovah's witness's refusal to get a blood transfusion after a car accident denies her right to
religious beliefs).
274. Id. at 768-69.
275. Catherine O'Neill, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards, Contaminated Fish, and
'Acceptable" Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 5-9 (2000) (observing that indigenous
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Courts have also limited comparative-fault defenses that would
restrict a plaintiffs property rights. In the contributory-negligence
context, the classic case limiting that defense based on property rights
is Leroy Fibre, wherein the railroad could not claim that the plaintiff
was negligent for storing flax on his property, even if the flax was
dangerously close to the railroad tracks. 276 Though dated, the case has
modern analogs in comparative fault. For example, a negligent golfer
could not defend on the basis that the plaintiff was negligent for living
so close to the golf course. 277 The limit has been placed on defenses of
comparative fault to personal property as well as to real property. For
example, a landlord and neighbor who put plaintiffs property outside
without plaintiffs knowledge, where the property was destroyed by
rain, could not defend based on the plaintiffs bad character that
arguably warranted his ouster from the apartment or for plaintiffs
failure to move his property out of the rain quickly enough. 27
Similarly, the comparative-fault defense has been limited
where it would undermine constitutional due process guarantees. For
example, a property owner whose property was demolished without
due process had no duty to the city to make it easier for the city to
notify him in advance. 279 Many of these limits on comparative-fault
defenses prevent defendants from obtaining greater property rights
through unreasonable conduct than they would be permitted to obtain
through reasonable conduct. Therefore, if a defendant could not obtain
a free easement over the plaintiffs property through reasonable
conduct, his negligence would not afford him a greater measure of
28 0
rights to use that property.

peoples for whom fish is central to their culture should not be considered at fault for eating fish
known to have been contaminated by others' pollution).
276. LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chic. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 348-52 (1914).
277. See Hennessey v. Pyne, 694 A.2d 691, 693 (R.I. 1997). But see Haydel v. Hercules, 645
So. 2d 418, 430 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (finding no manifest error in jury allocation of ten percent
fault to plaintiff who "panicked" and ran out of her house when ammonia cloud intentionally
released from truck seeped onto her property and through her windows and she feared for the
lives of herself and her children, as fleeing subjected her to greater exposure to ammonia).
278. Jacobs v. Westgate, 766 So. 2d 1175, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a
landlord and neighbor who put plaintiffs property outside without plaintiffs knowledge before it
started to rain could not claim plaintiffs fault for bad character or for failing to move property
out of the rain quickly enough).
279. Kline v. City of Spokane, No. 95-2-03940-0, 2001 WL 111753, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb.
6, 2001) (holding that a property owner whose property was demolished without due process had
no duty to the city to effect notice upon himself and that what he may or may not have done to
make things easier for the city to notify him was irrelevant to suit).
280. EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 8.2.1, at 190 ("The sticking point is that the farmer receives
no direct compensation from the railroad for his loss of use even if he garners some indirect
benefit in the form of lower rates.").
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Courts have not only drawn limits based on concerns about a
plaintiffs individual constitutional rights, but they have also given
latitude where structural constitutional issues are involved as well.
The long-recognized limitation on comparative-fault defenses in cases
in which the defendant violated a statute reflects separation of powers
principles. Of course, courts follow state dictates about conduct that is
not to be considered for comparative-fault purposes. For example,
courts routinely follow legislation that bars plaintiffs failure to wear a
seat belt from being considered comparative fault. 28 ' But concern for
preserving legislative enactments may animate court decisions even
where limitations are less explicit. For example, a desire to further a
legislative scheme to afford recovery may convince a court to bar
comparative fault as a defense to a violation of a statutory child labor
law but nevertheless to permit that defense in response to an
28 2
equivalent common law claim.
Other fundamental values that courts have considered in
28 3
limiting comparative-fault defenses include law compliance.
Additionally, just as military interests encroach on other
constitutional values, they also have been the basis for limits on
comparative-fault defenses. For example, courts have held that sailors
are not chargeable with comparative fault in certain circumstances in
which they simply follow the chain of command. 28 4
6.

Autonomy and Self-Risk Judgment

At times courts restrict comparative-fault defenses as a matter
of law when a jury could consider the plaintiffs choice to be
unreasonable, but the choice is one that risks harm to the plaintiff
alone, involves an aspect of plaintiff liberty or autonomy, and is not

281. See Roselyn Bonanti & Nancy Marcus, Seat Belt Defense Legislation, ADVOCATE, June
2001, at 1 (reporting that forty-two jurisdictions "prohibit using seat belt evidence to prove
comparative or contributory negligence" and that thirty-two jurisdictions "prohibit using a seat
belt defense to mitigate or reduce damages"); see, e.g., Rogeau v. Hyundai, 805 So. 2d 147, 155
(La. 2002) (holding that failure to wear a seatbelt cannot be raised as comparative negligence in
a product liability case).
282. See Sauter v. Ryan Props., Inc., No. C-8-96-326, 1996 WL 653954, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996) (permitting comparative negligence defense to negligence per se claim because statute is
being adopted by the common law for use, not legislative direction of powers).
283. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 775 A.2d 476, 481 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001)
(holding that a negligent driver who was evading police could not claim comparative fault of
police for getting in front of his car and slamming on the brakes).
284. See Simeonoff v. Hiner, 249 F.3d 883, 890 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[A] seaman may not be held
contributorily negligent for carrying out orders that result in injury, even if the seaman
recognizes possible danger and does not delay to consider a safer alternative.").

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1030

[Vol. 56:977

reckless. 28 5 In these cases, even when reasonable juries could differ as
to whether the plaintiffs risk to herself was reasonable, courts may
leave those decisions to the plaintiffs autonomous choice rather than
to a jury decision.
For example, in Thompson v. Michael, a seventeen-year-old girl
was a passenger in a sports car driven by her sixteen-year-old
friend. 28 6 The friend drove at fifty-five to sixty miles-per-hour on a
curving road with a thirty-five mile-per-hour speed limit, lost control
28 7
of the car, crossed the center lane, and caused a head-on collision.
Both driver and passenger were seriously injured, and another young
passenger was killed. 28 8 In a suit brought by the seventeen-year-old
passenger's family against the driver's family, the trial court granted
summary judgment to the passenger. 28 9 The defendant driver
appealed on the ground that there was a triable issue as to the
passenger's comparative fault. 290 Among his claims, the driver argued
that the passenger was negligent when she "rode with an
inexperienced driver" who was operating the car on an unfamiliar,
winding road. 29 1 The South Carolina Supreme Court quickly dismissed
this claim of comparative fault. 292 "The fact that [the passenger] knew
[the driver] had been driving only a short time is not evidence of
contributory negligence. In the absence of any fact or circumstance
indicating the driver is incompetent or careless, an occupant of a
vehicle is not required to anticipate negligence on the part of the
driver."

293

The court's rejection of the defense of passenger comparative
fault cannot be justified in simple risk terms. Data suggest that young
drivers are at a higher risk of car accidents, particularly when they

285. One might imagine, however, that under ordinary negligence standards, if the plaintiff
could have made a decision either way, the plaintiffs conduct would not have been negligent.
However, juries are generally given latitude to evaluate the reasonableness of the plaintiffs
conduct unless no reasonable jury could have found the conduct negligent. Thus, under ordinary
standards, a judge would not prevent a defense from being presented to a jury whenever a
reasonable plaintiff could have engaged in the conduct, but rather only in cases in which
reasonable minds could not differ as to the reasonableness of plaintiffs conduct-a standard that
exempts plaintiffs conduct from jury scrutiny in a narrower range of cases.
286. 433 S.E.2d 853, 854 (S.C. 1993).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 855.
293. Id. at 854 (emphasis added).
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are driving with friends. 294 This is why several states have adopted
graduated licensing requirements that prevent new drivers from
engaging in precisely this activity. 295 Riding with a young friend is
therefore a statistically greater risk, and if the passenger had an
alternate choice-driving with a parent or not driving at all-a jury
cost-benefit analysis might conclude that the conduct was
unreasonable.
Nevertheless, several rationales support this type of limit. One
296
is a desire to protect at least some measure of plaintiff autonomy. If
the Restatement draft truly intends to suggest that all risks of selfharm be subject to jury cost-benefit analysis, juries could determine
questions like whether the plaintiff should have exercised four times a
week, refrained from sex after being diagnosed with a heart condition,
eaten fewer candy bars and more peas, or driven to work early before
the rain. 29 7 Jury scrutiny of the risks to self that accompany every
decision from whether to have surgery to whether to cross the street
raise significant autonomy issues, although these are not necessarily
libertarian concerns. 298 The potential for infringing on autonomy may
be greater with respect to risks to self, because such risks include a
potentially more expansive and intimate category of conduct.
Moreover, autonomy concerns of evaluating risks to self are
exacerbated by the prospect that plaintiffs duty is owed to the world
299
at large.
In light of this potential for limitless jury scrutiny of plaintiff
choices, some courts have created limits that leave choices to
individual rather than to jury decision. This concern for protection of
294. Laura M. Rojas, Curbing Teenage Vehicular Freedom: The Brady-Jared Teen Driver
Safety Act of 1997, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 687, 691 (1997).
295. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 12509, 12513-14 (West 2000).
296. See Schwartz, supra note 86, at 718 n.96 (citing C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 17980 (1970) ("[I]n light of appreciable risk, driving to store for trivial purpose could be called
unreasonable, but this would unduly disparage man's capacity for enjoying life's trivial
pleasures.")).
297. Joe Burchell, Rain Plus Tucson Drivers Is a Formula for More Crashes, ARiz. DAILY
STAR, Dec. 7, 1997, at lB ("[A]uto insurance agents say their accident claims escalate twenty-five
percent to fifty percent on rainy days.").
298. EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 8.2, at 189 ("So long as P's careless acts could increase the
liability of another person, efforts to control her conduct cannot be dismissed as misguided
paternalism. The defense is designed to reduce the burdens that careless actions impose on other
individuals."). Requiring defendants to take reasonable care only for persons with few or no
liberties, but not others, does have libertarian implications.
299. See Baldwin v. City of Omaha, 607 N.W.2d 841, 855 (Neb. 2000) (holding that a
mentally ill arrestee shot by police who disregarded standard operating procedures for dealing
with person with mental illness could claim comparative fault of the arrestee plaintiff who failed
to take his antipsychotic medication, as plaintiff had a duty to the general public, if not himself,
to take his medication).
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individual decisionmaking parallels the concerns that surround the
tort of negligent supervision by parents. Many courts have either been
reluctant to adopt a reasonable-parent standard, or have adopted that
standard only while making clear that not all parental decisions will
be required to undergo jury scrutiny, because of a concern that
parents' child-rearing decisions need not be uniform or in conformance
with majority views. 300 In negligent supervision cases, courts want to
give individuals some sphere of autonomy in which decisions are left
to individual decisionmakers, not to jury cost-benefit calculations. It is
somewhat ironic that the plaintiffs unlimited duty proffered in the
draft Restatement would leave plaintiffs with more ability to make
decisions for their children than for themselves without jury
interference.
Courts have found a number of ways to create a partial zone of
autonomy around plaintiff decisions that risk self-harm. One approach
has been to hold that plaintiffs need not anticipate defendants'
negligence. 30 1 Another approach is to hold that plaintiffs are guilty of
comparative negligence only when they actually knew of a risk, not
when they knew or should have known of that risk. 30 2 A third
possibility in cases in which the plaintiffs conduct risked only selfharm would be to permit juries to consider plaintiff comparative fault
only if the plaintiff was reckless. A more lenient standard of review
than the standard of reasonable care has been embraced in other tort
and nontort contexts. 30 3 More lenient standards allow for review, but
also give deference to actors delegated primary decisionmaking
responsibility. They provide a little more room for decisionmaking
than the ordinary negligence standard.
300. See, e.g., Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 51 (Ariz. 1995) (Feldman, C.J.,
concurring) (stating that "there are areas of broad discretion in which only parents have
authority to make decisions" and adding that in these areas, which include deciding whether to
enroll a two-year-old in swim lessons, parents' conduct must be shown to be "palpably
unreasonable"); Rider v. Speaker, 692 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that babysitter
did not enjoy parental immunity, which is based on the importance of parental autonomy in
making decisions for the child, an interest the sitter did not have).
301. Rountree v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operation Auth., 261 A.D.2d 324, 32628 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)) (holding that a bus driver who stopped suddenly could not claim
comparative fault of passenger who had been drinking and did not grip the handrail tightly).
302. Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 682 A.2d 724, 735-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(ordering retrial on the issue of comparative fault because plaintiff could only be charged with
comparative fault if he were specifically aware of product risk); Kugler v. Tangiapahoa Parish
Sch. Bd., 752 So. 2d 375, 379 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (barring comparative fault to janitor who helped
parent move unstable cart as she did not know risk of danger of moving it).
303. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Review, 62 FORDHAM

L. REV. 437, 442 (1993) (arguing that the business judgment rule gives corporations room to
make decisions respecting the corporation's affairs without the need to defend the
reasonableness of every corporate decision to a jury).
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A number of cases have limited comparative-fault defenses
when plaintiff conduct involved a significant autonomy interest. In
some cases, the plaintiffs interest entails the freedom not to act. For
example, in Valinet v. Eskew, the plaintiff was injured when a dead
tree fell onto her car as she was driving down the highway during a
storm.3 0 4 The plaintiff claimed that the property owner was negligent
for failing to inspect and to remove the tree when it had been "dead for
three to five years and it had been showing signs of decay for eight to
twelve years."30 5 The defendant property owner alleged the plaintiffs
comparative negligence on the ground that plaintiff "drove by the tree
every day on her way to work and was just as capable of noticing it as
[the defendant], but continued to take the route regardless of the risks
involved." 30 6 The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed and held that, as a
matter of law, while "a possessor of land in an urban area has a duty
to exercise reasonable care in inspecting and maintaining trees on his
land, a passing motorist has no such corresponding duty."30 7 This
opinion seems to reflect the autonomy of nonownership of land.
Similarly, courts have held that a passenger in a car has the
autonomy not to pay attention to the road or warn of road hazards but
rather may let the driver assume that entire responsibility.3 0 8
Likewise, a bystander has the autonomy not to react to a nearby
altercation even if he could have safely fled the area. 30 9 In addition, a
wife may have no obligation to ensure that her husband follows a
reasonable diet and exercise. 310 A few courts have suggested that the
plaintiff has a physical autonomy interest in electing not to undergo
31 2
invasive procedures like a mastectomy 31 1 or a tubal ligation,
particularly when a medical procedure, even if likely to benefit the
plaintiff, involves a nontrivial risk of death. 31 3 And it has been held
304. 574 N.E.2d 283, 284 (Ind.1991).
305. Id. at 285.

306. Id. at 287.
307. Id.
308. See Boomer v. Frank, 993 P.2d 456, 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that "a passenger
or guest is not required to keep a lookout except in exceptional circumstances").
309. Foster v. Ankrum, 636 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 2001) (holding that a bystander who was
injured while watching an altercation was not negligent for failing to flee).
310. DeMoss v. Hamilton, 644 N.W.2d 302, 307 (Iowa 2002) (holding that decedent and his
wife were not contributorily negligent in malpractice case due to decedent's failure to follow a
reasonable diet and exercise plan).
311. See King v. Clark, 709 N.E.2d 1043, 1052-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (Robb, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a woman's choice not to get a mastectomy implicates her autonomy and cannot be
considered comparative fault).
312. Hall v. Dumitru, 620 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that plaintiff did not
have to get a second tubal ligation surgery to mitigate damages).
313. Id.
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that a plaintiff is not required to perform physical therapy exercises in
3 14
perpetuity.
At times courts have limited comparative-fault defenses when
the plaintiff conduct at issue involved a central interest such as
employment, 315 even when that employment was at a high-risk job or
time of day. 316 But courts have also limited comparative-fault defenses
when the plaintiffs autonomous choice involved more trivial liberties.
For example, a man could not be charged with comparative fault for
swimming in the ocean after he had previously experienced heart
trouble. 31 7 And a woman was not at fault for riding public
31 8
transportation by herself.
Overall, courts have carved out a number of limits on
comparative-fault defenses. In light of these myriad individual limits,
courts should carefully consider broader issues of principle and policy
that justify barring comparative-fault defenses.
IV. LIMITS BASED ON PRINCIPLE OR POLICY: PLAINTIFF NO-DUTY
DETERMINATIONS

Limits on comparative-fault defenses are inevitable. There
must be some baseline entitlements of a person who is entitled to the
reasonable care of others. For example, that person is entitled to
breathe air, walk on the public streets, and participate in society.
A number of scholars have urged that limits on comparativefault defenses be explicitly acknowledged. 3 19 The Restatement Third
encourages courts to set these explicit limits through plaintiff no-duty
determinations. The draft recognizes that "[j]ust as special problems of
policy may support a no-duty determination for a defendant, similar
concerns may support a no-duty determination for plaintiff
negligence ."320

314. Greenwood v. Mitchell, 621 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Iowa 2001).
315. Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 173 (La. 1985) (Watson, J., concurring) ("An
employee who is at his proper post using machinery furnished by the employer is not ordinarily
guilty of contributory negligence because he has no choice other than to work or quit ....).
316. See Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 816 S.W.2d 455, 469 (Tex. App. 1991) (implying that a
teenaged service station employee's comparative fault might be an appropriate question for
evidentiary consideration, but finding no evidence that plaintiff had a better employment
option).
317. Richwalt v. Richfield Lakes Corp., 633 N.W.2d 418, 424-25 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
318. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Allen, 374 S.E.2d 761, 766 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
319. One of the most thoughtful early articles advocating such limits is Schwartz, supra note
86, at 718 ("[Slome of this conduct [termed contributory negligence] perhaps should not be
deterred after all, despite its appearance of'unreasonableness'....").
320. RESTATEMENT OF APPORTIONMENT, supra note 4, § 7 note h.
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Even though courts have devised principle and policy limits on
comparative-fault defenses without a formal element for recognizing
these limits, an explicit no-duty doctrine, like the one proposed in the
latest Restatement, offers a number of advantages. In particular, the
doctrine would allow courts to articulate categorical reasons for
denying comparative-fault defenses more forthrightly, thereby
ensuring greater consistency between similar cases and giving judges
a firmer understanding of their legitimate role in defining and
protecting both the plaintiffs and the defendant's interests. 32 1 These
no-duty determinations are particularly important in light of the
potential for broad plaintiff-fault defenses, which stem in part from
322
changes in tort systems such as comparative apportionment.
Furthermore, judicial limits on duty may be more important for
plaintiffs than defendants because one might expect more frivolous
contributory-negligence defenses than negligence claims, given the
323
relative ease of filing a defense.
In the absence of an explicit doctrine for limiting comparativefault defenses in light of principle or policy, some courts may not
realize their important role in setting these limits. Thus far, courts
have sent a number of problematic comparative-fault claims to juries
without addressing or perhaps even recognizing other options. 324 For
example, while traditional tort doctrine provides that "we would not
let the doctor claim that the patient negligently caused heart

321. Cf. Wex S. Malone, Some Ruminations on Contributory Negligence, 65 UTAH L. REV. 91,
94-95 (1981) (lamenting that the search for values in negligence and contributory negligence is
obscured by doctrinal approach rather than illuminated by deliberate and thoughtful
examination of relevant policy considerations).
322. For example, refusing to compare intentional and negligent torts prevented intentional
tortfeasor defendants from taking advantage of plaintiff-fault defenses.
323. Adopting plaintiff no-duty rules may save administrative costs because judicially
enforced limits will prevent marginal comparative negligence defenses from being litigated.
However, these rules will inject an additional issue-whether the jury should be permitted to
evaluate the plaintiffs negligence. The more that courts are able to define plaintiff no-duty
concept through concrete rules, the greater the administrative cost savings are likely to be.
324. Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 243, 249 (D. Md. 1993) (holding that sharing
needles was contributory negligence to an insurance company's nondisclosure to applicant of
positive AIDS test); Mills v. Smith, 673 P.2d 117, 121-22 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (permitting
imputed comparative-fault defense in case in which a twenty-one-month-old child was bitten by
the defendant's pet African lion); Haydel v. Hercules Transport, Inc., 645 So. 2d 418, 431 (La. Ct.
App. 1995) (finding no manifest error in jury allocation of ten percent fault to plaintiff who
"panicked" and feared for her and her children's lives when she saw ammonia cloud); Klingle v.
Versatile Corp., 606 N.Y.S.2d 71, 72-73 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff who failed to
stop eating a sandwich covered in oven degreaser after noticing it tasted funny could be charged
with comparative fault); McCrystal v. Trumbull Mem'l Hosp., 684 N.E.2d 721, 725-26 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that a pregnant woman can be held comparatively negligent for following
nurse's advice not to go to the hospital for bleeding).
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disease," 325 a number of recent cases have allowed that defense to be
326
resolved by the jury.
It may be argued that the Restatement should limit plaintifffault defenses more fundamentally. Some scholars argue that
comparative fault ought to be abolished in its entirety. 327 All questions
of plaintiff comparative fault can be resolved through the scope of the
defendant's duty and were resolved in that manner for many years. 328
Contributory negligence "throws on the individual the primary burden
of protecting his own interest," and the justifications for the doctrine,
which have been labeled ex post rationalizations, have been
considered too individualistic. 329
Even if one accepts the doctrine of comparative fault, broader
limits on the defense might be advocated. For example, instead of
encouraging judges to carve out exceptions to a broad rule of plaintiff
obligation, the Restatement could narrow the definition of plaintiffs'
obligation of care as an original matter. No duty could be regarded as
the baseline for plaintiffs and defendants, with duties to self and
others limited and articulated.330 In the alternative, plaintiffs'
obligation of reasonable care might be limited to harm to others, not to
331
self as well.
Each of these alternatives has merit. But many of the concerns
that underlie them can be taken into account through rules that
permit exceptions based on principle or policy. Moreover, it would be
equally difficult to build all of the diverse policy and principle concerns
that warrant limits on comparative-fault defenses into general rules of
defendant duty and plaintiff obligation.

325. Powers, supranote 234, at 1575.
326. See, e.g., Magee v. Pittman, 761 So. 2d 731, 742-43 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding jury
determination of comparative fault in plaintiffs case against doctor for emergency room
malpractice in part because "[t]he evidence reveals Mr. Magee smoked cigarettes regularly, and
that smoking is a risk factor of coronary artery disease"); Elkins v. Ferencz, 694 N.Y.S.2d 27, 28
(App. Div. 1999) (permitting comparative-fault defense to dentist who failed to diagnosis
patient's periodontal disease because of the patient's overuse of prescription drugs, smoking,
failure to furnish a complete medical history, and delay in receiving treatment).
327. MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977);

Schwartz, supra note 86, at 699 ("England's most interesting tort scholar has proposed the
complete elimination of the defense in all personal injury negligence cases."); Bar-Gill & Shahar,
supra note 92 (questioning the efficiency basis for a comparative-negligence rule).
328. EPSTEIN, supra note 21; SHAPO, supra note 49, 31.01, at 127.
329. Bohlen, supra note 88, at 253.
330. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 8, at 661 (criticizing the Restatement's attempt to
"downplay" the role of duty in tort law); see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1825-47 (1998) (advocating the use of "the
relational conception of duty" in negligence cases).
331. Wright, supra note 12, at 1191-92.
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If courts limit plaintiff obligations through principle and policy
analysis, as the Restatement suggests, important issues arise as to
how to draw these limits. One issue is terminology. The Restatement of
Apportionment and some courts and commentators have called these
principle- and policy-based limits plaintiff "no duty" rulesY 2 As
purists will hasten to note, plaintiff no-duty terminology is technically
incorrect. 333 With one exception, 334 plaintiffs' obligation is not a duty if
we mean that the plaintiff can be sued for a breach of that
obligation. 335 In general, the plaintiff does not owe herself a duty to
protect herself. Rather, she owes the defendant a duty to minimize the
scope of liability should [the defendant] take actions that could harm
[the plaintiff]. '"336 Thus the plaintiffs duty is akin to a "duty" to
mitigate the defendant's liability for damages.
The plaintiff no-duty terminology is potentially unhelpful
because its implicit suggestion that plaintiffs and defendants receive
similar treatment obscures some differences between the obligations
of plaintiff and defendant. In practical terms, for example, no-duty
rules always protect defendants. If the defendant has no duty, he also
has no liability. However, if a court determines that a plaintiff has "no
duty," the plaintiff may be more or less likely to recover a judgment
from the defendant. When a court determines that the plaintiff has no
duty, that determination is rarely tantamount to a finding that the
defendant is liable to the plaintiff.
332. RESTATEMENT OF APPORTIONMENT, supra note 4, § 3d cmt. d; see also Hutchison v.
Luddy, 763 A.2d 826 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); Brown v. Dibbell, 595 N.W.2d 358 (Wis. 1999);
Bublick, supra note 70, at 1417.
333. DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 270, at 273 ("The no duty language is infelicitous in one
respect, since "duty" refers to an obligation enforceable by suit."); see also Law v. Superior Court,
755 P.2d 1135, 1141-42 (Ariz. 1988) (noting that while "in all but the rarest situation nonuse of a
seatbelt presents no foreseeable danger to others, it is probably incorrect to conceptualize the
seatbelt defense in terms of duty" but then characterizing the need for plaintiff to wear a seatbelt
as "part of the [plaintiffs] related obligation to conduct oneself reasonably to minimize damages
and avoid foreseeable harm to oneself").
334. In one circumstance the plaintiff might truly be said to have no duty. The draft
Restatement's negligence rule previously provided that "[ain actor who negligently causes
physical harm is subject to liability for that harm," and included unreasonable risks to self in
the definition of negligence. RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra
note 3, § 6. Accordingly, this provision seems to permit a plaintiff who negligently causes
physical harm to herself to sue herself. Although a plaintiff would not ordinarily be expected to
sue herself for negligence, such a possibility could come to fruition if the plaintiff had insurance
that might cover such suits, or if such a suit might make a difference in an apportionment
calculation. A rule that would prevent a plaintiff from suing herself for her own negligently
created risks to self would be, in earnest, a plaintiff no-duty rule.
335. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 23-114 (1978)
(categorizing legal relationships).
336. EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 8.2.1, at 189. The plaintiffs unreasonable conduct often risks
others' financial interests rather than their physical safety.
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Nevertheless, the plaintiff no-duty terminology provides an
analogy to a commonly understood group of categorical rules that limit
defendants' liability. "[T]he point of using no duty language.., is to
draw attention to a parallel set of rules that relieve defendants of
liability for negligent conduct."3 37 Thus, despite the inadequacies of
the term, the no-duty language seems more helpful than any other
term.
The Restatement's black-letter no-duty provisions should be
helpful to courts. The current provisions, which have evolved to take
fuller account of limits on comparative negligence as well as
negligence, provide a clear and potentially strong mechanism for
courts to delineate categorical limits. Even so, additional
enhancements might be suggested.
As for black-letter provisions, the Restatement text could be
even clearer. As written, the black-letter provision of section 7
proceeds in neutral terms with respect to plaintiffs and defendants,
but then outlines only what happens to the defendant's liability in the
case of a no-duty determination. To be clearer, the provision might
specify what a court should do in the case of a plaintiff no-duty
determination-for example, strike the defense, limit evidence related
to it, and issue special instructions to the jury that the plaintiff has
special principle and policy rights for which it should not account in
its decisionmaking process.
In addition, it would be helpful for Restatement illustrations to
include more plaintiff no-duty cases alongside its many defendant noduty examples. The Restatement's categories of defendant no-duty
cases all have similar plaintiff no-duty analogues. For example, the
Restatement discusses limits on defendant property owners' duty to
338
plaintiffs injured while trespassing on the owner's property.
Alongside this case, the Restatement could cite a case that limits a
negligent plaintiff property owner's duty to a trespasser. For example,
it might cite Mondry v. City of South St. Paul.339 In that case, the
plaintiff, walking on his property in the dark after he had a few
drinks, walked into a nine-foot by five-foot orange snowplow bucket
left on his property by the defendant. 340 Despite the plaintiffs
carelessness, the court held that a contributory-negligence defense
was inappropriate because the plaintiff was "on his own property" and

337.
338.
339.
340.

DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 270, at 273.
RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 2, supra note 9, § 7 cmt. a.
No. C4-01-1845, 2002 WL 554360 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2002).
Id. at *1.
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the trespassing city "had no legal right to place its equipment on his
4
property where [plaintiff] could walk into it." '
The Restatement also suggests that dramshop and social host
liability may be areas in which judges may choose to develop
defendant no-duty analysis-for example, in the case of social hosts
based on social norms. 342 Similarly, when courts assign dramshop
liability to defendants, they may determine that with respect to at
least some plaintiffs, the plaintiffs comparative fault cannot be used
343
as a defense.
The Restatement also provides illustrations of cases in which
defendants' duties are limited to a class of persons. As an example, the
Restatement provides the fireman's rule-the rule that a defendant
who negligently triggers the need for public protection services need
not respond in damages to a professional rescuer. 3 44 Such a defendant
no-duty case finds its complement in cases in which a plaintiff who
negligently triggers a need for protective services is not subject to a
defense of comparative fault based on his conduct when police respond
with excessive force. 345 In both sets of cases the actor can be said to
owe no duty to law enforcement personnel not to trigger a need for
their reasonable protective services.
Not only does the Restatement suggest that a defendant's duty
may have certain relational limits, but it also suggests that it may be
346
limited to a lower level of care or to particular negligence claims.
The Restatement provides an illustration of a product manufacturer
that may not have a duty to warn of obvious risks but that still has a
duty to design a reasonably careful product. For the point that the

341. Id. at *3; see also LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chic. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 34852 (1914) (finding plaintiff company not contributorily negligent for destruction of their flax
straw on its property adjacent to defendant's railroad track when the railroad negligently
emitted sparks igniting the straw on the grounds that the plaintiff was under no duty to prevent
damage from the railroad's "wrongful operation"); Gordon v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. Civ.
A. 10753, 2002 WL 550472, at *16 (Del. Ch. 2002) (holding that plaintiff owners of a landfill were
not guilty of contributory negligence for failing to test fill for contaminants before depositing it in
their landfill because "they were under no legal duty to anticipate that [defendant] would violate
the terms of the license").
342. RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 7 cmt. c
reporter's note.
343. Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc., 643 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Iowa 2002) (holding that "comparative
fault does not play a role in a dramshop action").
344. RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 2, supra note 9, § 7 cmt. e
reporter's note (citing Krause v. U.S. Truck Co., 787 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. 1990)).
345. Mikel v. City of Rochester, 695 N.Y.S.2d 462, 463 (App. Div. 1999) (denying claim of
comparative fault to police officer who negligently executed search warrant against injured
plaintiff for engaging in criminal activity).
346. RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 2, supra note 9, § 7 cmt. a.
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plaintiffs duty might be similarly limited, the court might cite Greycas
v. Proud, a case in which the plaintiff lawyer had a duty of reasonable
care but did not need to assume that opposing counsel was careless or
dishonest.3 47 To show that plaintiffs at times have a limited duty not
to be reckless, the Restatement might refer to the circumstance of a
348
rescuer.
Reporters' note cases, like comment illustrations, also have
plaintiff no-duty corollaries. The reporter's notes mention defendant
no-duty rules that prevent a defendant from being held liable for
failing to follow a robber's demand to hand over money to prevent a
customer from being killed. 349 In a similar vein, a plaintiff might have
350
no duty to hand her keys to a carjacker.
The reporter's note citation concluding that Magic Johnson had
no duty to reveal his prior high-risk sexual behavior to his partners
based on his privacy concerns 351 may be contrasted with a case that
found a plaintiff did have a duty to reveal that she was a diabetic to
her sexual partner. 3 2 In addition, while an employer might have no
duty to retrofit its equipment with new safety devices, 353 an employee
35 4
might have no duty to quit that unsafe job.
Just as Restatement illustrations of no duty should include
cases involving plaintiffs, the Restatement's illustrations of
nonnegligence should also include examples of plaintiff and defendant
nonnegligence. For example, Restatement section 3f suggests that a
court could find no defendant negligence in a case in which the
defendant city failed to adopt an aggressive program to determine if

347. Greycas v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1565-66 (7th Cir. 1987).
348. See, e.g., N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTR.-CIVIL 2:41 ('The law will not view an attempt to
preserve life as negligent unless the attempt, under the circumstances, was reckless.").
349. RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 2, supra note 9, § 7 cmt. c

reporters note (citing Ky. Fried Chicken v. Superior Court, 927 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1997)).
350. Dye v. Schwegman Giant Supermkts., Inc., 599 So. 2d 412, 417 (La. Ct. App. 1992)
(barring comparative-fault defense against victim who actively resisted carjacker despite
testimony that this response to a carjacking was inappropriate).
351. RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 2, supra note 9, § 7 cmt. c
reporter's note (citing Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993)).
352. Gross v. Werling, No. 2-99-06, 1999 WL 1015072, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1999).
353. RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 2, supra note 9, § 7 cmt c.

reporter's note (citing Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 944 P.2d 1279 (Haw. 1997)).
354. See, e.g., Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 173 (La. 1985) (Watson, J., concurring)
("An employee who is at his proper post of employment using machinery furnished by the
employer isnot ordinarily guilty of contributory negligence because he has no choice other than
to work or quit ...").
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its trees had defects that posed a hazard to people or property. 55
Alongside that illustration, the court might cite Valinet v. Eskew, a
case in which the Indiana Supreme Court held that a driver who
traveled a certain route each day was not guilty of comparative
negligence for failing to notice that the tree by the roadside had been
356
dead for a number of years.
Similarly, Restatement section 3, comment g cites a line of
cases in which the defendant is not negligent because he has no
knowledge and "no means of knowledge" of the danger absent "great
inconvenience." Specifically, the Restatement discusses a case in which
a carrier delivered a package that contained dynamite but had no way
of knowing the contents of the package short of opening every package
it delivered. 357 A parallel plaintiff case would be Strom v. Logan, in
which the plaintiff was injured in a home fire, but had no way of
knowing that a prior home repair had been faulty without inspecting
358
work that had been done behind the walls.
The Restatement, as it has evolved, has recognized the
importance of equal consideration of problems of principle or policy
warranting categorical rules to remove reasonableness questions from
jury decisions-for both plaintiffs and defendants. Parallel
clarifications and illustrations of plaintiff no-duty cases would make
the Restatement no-duty principles easier to understand and to apply
in the context of plaintiffs, where courts are less practiced in
recognizing limits through the no-duty element.
Moreover, in the Restatement and in state courts, it would be
helpful to clarify proximate cause limits on the category of people to
whom plaintiffs owe a duty-for example, only those defendants who
are negligent (rather than reckless or intentional) and whose
negligence was known to the plaintiff, or at least reasonably
359
foreseeable.
Even if further clarifications and illustrations are not built
directly into the Restatement text, courts can certainly apply these
parallels to the cases before them. The assembled individual
355. RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, DRAFT 1, supra note 3, § 3 cmt. f

(examining the case of a plaintiff who was driving on a street during a windstorm when a tree on
city property fell on her car).
356. 574 N.E.2d 283, 287 (Ind. 1991).
357. The Nitroglycerin Case, 82 U.S. 524, 534-35 (1872).
358. 18 P.3d 1024, 1029 (Mont. 2001).
359. The plaintiffs obligation may be defined not as a duty in the air owed to everyone, but
rather as a duty owed to only some defendants and not to others. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 248 N.E. 339, 341 (N.Y. 1928) ("Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the
invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a right. Proof of negligence in the air, so
to speak, will not do.") (internal citations omitted).
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exceptions courts have crafted in cases alleging plaintiffs' comparative
fault reveal an impressive forest of principles and policies.
V. CONCLUSION
It may seem unusual to discuss limits on plaintiffs' duties now.
Comparative fault was meant to decrease the role of judges and give
more cases to the jury for compromise solutions, and it undoubtedly
has done so. Yet there are a number of reasons to reexamine legal
limits at this juncture.
Looking past the tort law to other legal trends sheds some
light. At the same moment at which tort law is leaving an increasing
number of issues to jury decision, criminal law, tort's historical cousin,
is taking precisely the opposite course. Federal criminal courts have
dramatically limited sentencing (and now charging) authority by
enacting elaborate grids and guidelines to ensure more rule-based
consistency and less discretion. 360 These changes were designed to
make sentencing decisions more transparent, reviewable, and subject
to legal controls. Perhaps increased transparency and consistency are
the aims toward which legal limits on comparative-fault and fault
defenses are aspiring.
36 1
Despite the importance of consistency and transparency,
those goals increasingly are threatened by current trends in tort law.
Tort law continues to shift toward jury process and away from defined
legal rules. In particular, the advent of comparative apportionment
with its mixed determinations of cause and fault threatens to give
362
juries unreviewable authority.
The need to limit comparative-fault defenses also stems from
other shifts in tort doctrine-in particular, the shift away from the
doctrine of assumption of risk and toward comparative fault. 363 Years
ago, defendants sought to invoke broad assumption-of-risk defenses to
minimize their obligations. Scholars criticized these broad defenses so
360. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2002); Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-85 (2000) (finding unconstitutional a state statute allowing judge
to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory range on grounds that it contravenes the jury's factfinding duties). One might argue that this limit on judicial sentencing authority is consistent
with tort law jury delegation in that both trends remove decisionmaking power from judges.
361. Transparency and consistency may be particularly important to both criminal and tort
law in light of public disaffection and pressure for change. In public policy disputes marked by
anecdotal evidence, it is difficult to defend a legal system for which rules and penalties cannot be
articulated clearly.
362. See RESTATEMENT OF APPORTIONMENT, supra note 4, § 8 (enumerating factors used for
assigning shares of responsibility).
363. EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 8.6.2, at 200.

2003]

COMPARATIVE FAULT TO THE LIMITS

1043

successfully that the most recent Restatement has abolished implied
assumption of risk in its entirety. 36 4 Yet these same overbroad
defenses simply have been transformed into overbroad defenses of
comparative fault. 36 5 As such, the substantive concerns raised by
scholars who criticized assumption of risk's erosion of defendants' duty
are softened but not eliminated within comparative fault. Not only
have old assumption-of-risk arguments been repackaged as
comparative-fault defenses, but new plaintiff-fault arguments are also
beginning to appear. Comparative-fault defenses that could not have
surmounted the all-or-nothing hurdle of assumption of risk are easier
to mount when the argument need only shave a few percentage points
off the defendant's liability.
Another internal pressure to limit comparative-fault defenses
stems from legislative tort reform and its restrictions on liability.
Torts statesman Wex Malone opined that New York courts had
established contributory negligence years ago, because the courts felt
that defendants' negligence liability was fixed by statute at too high a
level. 36 6 Now that many courts and commentators regard defendants'
liability as fixed by statute at too low a level-due to damage caps,
abolition of joint and several liability, and modified comparative fault
among other limits-limiting plaintiff comparative-fault defenses may
be one way to ameliorate the harshness of those doctrines. 36 7 While
the effect of limiting comparative-fault defenses remains unclear, such
limits apparently would increase defendant care because most states
have modified comparative-fault systems, which already eliminate
plaintiff recovery in cases with strong components of plaintiff fault.
Judicial limits on comparative-fault defenses may result in more
defendant care by affording full damages in cases with low plaintiff

364. See RESTATEMENT OF APPORTIONMENT, supra note 4, § 2 cmt. i reporter's note.
365. For an example of this shift from defendants employing assumption of risk to
comparative fault as a defense, compare Rickey v. Boden, 421 A.2d 539, 543 (R.I. 1980), with
Morrocco v. Piccardi, 713 A.2d 250, 253 (R.I. 1998). See also SHAPO, supra note 49,
32.01, at
131 ("Some analysts believe it would be wise to chalk up most 'assumption of risk' defenses
under the contributory negligence rubric.")
366. Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151, 155,

162, 166-69 (1946) (stating that nineteenth-century judges' "seething, although somewhat covert,
dissatisfaction" with juries in railroad crossing accident cases alongside a definition of fault
"frozen by the legislature" prompted judges to exert greater controls on juries through
contributory negligence).
367. Some of the most "thoughtful commentators" believe that pure comparative negligence
is the most fair system. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 201, at 505. Most legislatures, however, have
enacted modified comparative-fault systems. RESTATEMENT OF APPORTIONMENT, supra note 4,
tbl.
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comparative fault-a result that better approximates the pure
368
comparative-fault system that most scholars consider optimal.
Other possible influences can be cited. With the rise of mass
corporations and repeat tortfeasors, courts may endorse systemic
rather than individual controls to enhance safety.3 69 Moreover,
plaintiff comparative-fault defenses may expand as defendants' tort
obligations expand. 370 Limits on plaintiff-fault defenses may also be
seen as another attempt to commandeer the tort law to promote
3 71
particular interests.
Whatever the forces that propel renewed interest in tort law
standards, the time has come for considering standards in the area of
comparative fault. Courts could leave all issues of defendant
negligence to jurors to resolve as a question of risk and utility;
however configured, they do not do so. Courts limit defendants'
372
negligence liability in both case-specific and categorical ways.
Similarly, courts could leave all questions of plaintiff comparative
fault for juror risk-utility determination. Here too, courts endorse
numerous fact-specific and categorical restrictions.37 3 The Restatement
368. Hayden, supra note 73, at 919, 945 (arguing that courts that retain pure comparative
fault use plaintiffs fault as superseding cause or as a "relief valve" to eliminate some plaintiff
claims).
369. EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 8.1, at 189 ('The impulse behind the strong version of the
contributory negligence defense has both moral and economic overtones, congenial to an
individualistic age."); Prosser, supra note 4, at 4 ("Probably the true explanation [of comparative
fault as a defense] lies merely in the highly individualistic attitude of the common law of the
early nineteenth century.").
370. EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 8.6.1, at 198 (noting that there was not much defendant
liability to which claims of plaintiff assumption of risk were raised before industrialization). It
has been argued that contributory negligence itself arose against a backdrop in which "the social
duties of one citizen to another became enormously enlarged." Bohlen, supra note 88, at 254.
371. No-duty rules for both defendants and plaintiffs may be a way for special interests to
commandeer the tort process. Justice Feldman of the Arizona Supreme Court forewarns that
after the court's acceptance of the state legislature's creation of governmental immunity,
[wihat may come next is of serious concern. Human nature, particularly that of the
bureaucracy, is such that it is unlikely that any public entity will approach the
legislature with a request that it be held responsible, as are common folk, for its
misdeeds or those of its employees. What I fear we will hear, instead, is the need for
immunity of all kinds because otherwise the agency is underfunded, unable to meet
its obligations, its employees are concerned about liability and therefore unable to
perform their duties, its budget will not allow for the cost of risk management or
paying the bills for its misdeeds, the judicial system is unworkable, juries can not be
trusted, and so on, ad infinitum.
Clouse v. State, 16 P.3d 757, 776 (2001) (Feldman, J., dissenting).
372. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 7, § 149, at 355-59 (outlining the role of the judge in taking
cases away from the jury for categorical and case-specific reasons), § 225, at 575-77 (addressing
the concepts of immunity and limited duty).
373. Some recent state supreme court decisions have limited defenses alleging plaintiff
comparative fault. See, e.g., Greenwood v. Mitchell, 621 N.W.2d 200, 205 (Iowa 2001) (holding
that the lower court erred in submitting the issue of accident victim's failure to perform physical
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of Liability for Physical Harm at last gives judges the discretion to
recognize the contours and validity of these limits in tandem.

therapy exercises "in perpetuity" to the jury on the question of mitigation of damages); Walter v.
Wal-Mart Stores, 748 A.2d 961, 971-72 (Me. 2000) (finding that the lower court did not err in
refusing to instruct the jury on comparative fault in a pharmacist malpractice case in which the
patient did not know the name of the chemotherapy drug being prescribed and delayed in
reporting the drug's side effects to her doctor); see also Strom v. Logan, 18 P.3d 1024, 1029
(Mont. 2001) (holding in a negligent misrepresentation case that the home purchaser's failure to
inspect latent defects concealed behind walls and ceilings "[did] not amount to contributory
negligence").
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The issues presented by the intersection of the patent system and
the antitrust laws have never been as pressing as they are today. The
number of issued patents is skyrocketing. Companies are more frequently entering into arrangementswith competitors not only to recover
their investment from creating patented products but also to avoid the
patent landmines that line the path of innovation. They form patent
pools for laser eye surgery, MPEG-2 video compression technology, and
DVD formatting; enter into alliances, mergers, and settlements in the
biopharmaceuticalindustry; refuse to license their patented products in
various industries;and cross-license their patents in the semiconductor
industry.
But the need for collaborative and exclusionary conduct under
the patent system is matched by the heightened suspicion of the antitrust laws. Antitrust looks at these patent-based activities and sees
lessened competition, increasedprice, and reduced output. And it pays
scant attention to the benefits of the activity in promoting innovation or
the justificationfor the activity based on the patent system.
This Article resolves the patent-antitrustparadox in three steps.
First, it offers innovation as the common denominator of the patent
and antitrust laws. Second, it proposes a new explanation that firms
can offer in defense of the challenged activity: that it is reasonably necessary to attain tripartite innovation. Tripartiteinnovation denotes the
three temporal stages of innovation: the creation of the product, the recovery of the investment incurred in creating the product, and the circumvention of patent bottlenecks that block the path of innovation.
Third, it carves out a greater role for the justification in all aspects of
antitrust activity, including mergers, joint ventures, patent pools, licensing, and refusals to license. The approach offered by this Article
thus prescribes a more prominent and lasting role in antitrust analysis
for the patent system and for the multiple components of innovation.

